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INTRODUCTION

Maryland citizens are far more likely to come into contact with
administrative agencies during the course of their lives than any
other branch l of government. 2 A citizen's contact with administrative agencies varies markedly and can range from applying for a
motor vehicle license 3 to being fined for failing to comply with an
agency's regulation. 4 As a creature of statute, however, an adminisI. While not technically considered one of the traditional branches of government, many commentators liken administrative agencies to a branch of government co-equal to the executive, legislative, and judicial branches. See Frederick
R. Anderson, Revisiting the Constitutional Status oj the Administrative Agencies, 36
AM. U. L. REv. 277, 278 (1987) ("Delegation is the broad channel through
which increasing power has flowed to what many feel is a de facto fourth
branch."); Peter B. McCutchen, Mistakes, Precedent, and the Rise of the Administrative State: Toward a Constitutional Theory of the Second Best, 80 CORNELL L. REv.
I, 1 (1994) ("Uustice RobertJackson] coined the term 'fourth branch' to describe administrative agencies and contended that this fourth branch 'has deranged our three-branch legal theories much as the concept of a fourth dimension unsettles our three-dimensional thinking.''' (quoting FTC v.
Ruberoid Co., 343 U.S. 470, 487 (1952) Uackson, j., dissenting»; Richard Posner, The Constitution as an Economic Document, 56 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 4, 29
(1987) (" Oludicial interpretations have, by authorizing a 'Fourth Branch' of
administrative agencies by expansively construing congressional power over interstate and foreign commerce and congressional power to enact statutes that
purportedly promote the general welfare, greatly strengthened the power of
the federal government to regulate markets.").
2. See Thomas O. Sargentich, Teaching Administrative Law in the Twenty-First Century, I WIDNER]. PUB. L. 147, 148 (1992) (noting that " [d]ay-to-day encounters
between the government and the public most commonly involve agencies as
opposed to courts or legislatures").
3. See MD. CODE ANN., TRANSP. II § 16-606 (1998).
4. See, e.g., COMAR 08.07.01.17 (requiring a dog to be on a leash in state parks
and requiring pets to be "kept under reasonable control"). For example, Maryland dog owners who fail to leash their dogs in local parks are first issued
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trative agency's regulatory authority does not reach beyond those
powers conveyed to it by its organic legislation-the agency's enabling statute. 5
A recurring issue in administrative law is the extent to which an
agency may lawfully exercise power when its enabling statute contains a broad delegation of power. 6 In Lussier v. Maryland Racing
Commission,? the Court of Appeals of Maryland considered whether
an administrative agency may impose a fine absent explicit authority
to do so in its enabling statute. 8 In resolving this issue in the
agency's favor, the court of appeals expanded the power agencies
may imply from broad enabling statutes. 9
Specifically, the Lussier court addressed a regulation promulgated by the Maryland Racing Commission (MRC).IO The regulation
permitted the MRC to issue fines for violations of various MRC regulations.ll However, the broad enabling statute that empowered the
MRC to promulgate its regulation did not explicitly authorize the
MRC to create a regulation permitting fines. 12 Nevertheless, the
MRC imposed a $5000 fine on Frank P. Lussier after it determined

5.

6.
7.
8.

9.
lO.
11.
12.

warnings by park rangers, but "a second scolding will most likely mean a
ticket, and repeat offenses could lead to a $5,000 fine." Candus Thomson, Urban An~t Intrudes on Outdoor Trails; Recreation Etiquette Encouraged l7y Police, THE
SUN (BALT.), June 8, 1998, at B1.
See Holy Cross Hosp. v. Health Servs. Cost Review Comm'n, 283 Md. 677, 683,
393 A.2d 181, 184 (1978). An enabling statute is "any statute enabling persons
or corporations, or administrative agencies to do what before they could not
do. It is applied to statutes which confer new powers." BlACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 364 (6th ed. 1990). A legislature "creates an agency by enacting a statute
(usually called an 'enabling act' or an 'organic statute' interchangeably),
which provides rules that control and limit the agency's exercise of its authority." Keith Werhan, The Neoclassical Revival in Administrative Law, 44 ADMIN. L.
REv. 567, 569 (1992). While the terms "organic statute" and "enabling statute"
are synonymous, this Note refers to these statutes as enabling statutes for the
purpose of consistency and because of the term's superior descriptive qualities-these statutes enable the agency to carry out the very purpose of its existence.
See infra notes 49-146, 168-79, 183-264 and accompanying text.
343 Md. 681, 684 A.2d 804 (1996).
See id. at 684-85, 684 A.2d at 805.
For a discussion of how Lussier broadened Maryland law, see infra notes 482508 and accompanying text.
See Lussier, 343 Md. at 684-85, 684 A.2d at 805.
See id. at 684, 684 A.2d at 805.
See id. at 687, 684 A.2d at 807 (construing MD. CODE ANN .. Bus. REG. § 11-210
(1992»; id. at 710,684 A.2d at 818 (Bell, J., dissenting) (construing MD. CODE
ANN., Bus. REG. § 11-210 (1992».

518

Baltimore Law Review

[Vol. 27

that he had engaged in conduct that violated several of the MRC's
administrative regulations. 13 Lussier sought judicial review of the
MRC's decision, challenging both the constitutionality of the delegation of power l4 and the MRC's construction of its enabling statute. 15
The Court of Appeals of Maryland upheld the validity of the
administrative regulation promulgated by the MRC that authorized
the fine. 16 Specifically, the Lussier court held that the MRC's selfcreated power to fine was valid without explicit authority in its enabling statute. 17 The MRC's regulation was upheld because it was
promulgated pursuant to a broad statutory delegation of authority
and was consistent with the legislative history and prior applications
of the statute. IS Following Lussier, Maryland courts enjoy greater discretion in determining the validity of an agency's power to fine
under broad statutory grants. 19
This Note attempts to synthesize the pertinent areas of administrative law that underlie the court of appeals's decision in Lussier.21J
Part II briefly develops the relevant areas of federal administrative
law from which many states have developed their administrative law
jurisprudenceY Part III addresses state administrative law by exploring Maryland's constitutional framework for decisionmaking. 22 Part
IV focuses on Maryland's common-law rules of statutory construction. 23 The statutory construction analysis focuses on canons unique
13. See id. at 684, 684 A.2d at 805. For a further discussion of the regulations
Lussier violated, see infra notes 439-41.
14. In Lussier's brief submitted to the court of appeals, he challenged the constitutionality of the MRC's acts and the legislature's standard-less delegation of
power by relying on three seminal nondelegation doctrine cases of the court
of appeals. See Brief for Petitioner at 10-19, Lussier v. Maryland Racing
Comm'n, 343 Md. 681, 684 A.2d 804 (1996) (No. 94-96). For a discussion of
the three opinions relied on by Lussier and distinguished by the court of appeals, see infra notes 454-64 and accompanying text. However, in its majority
opinion, the Court of Appeals of Maryland eschewed the constitutional issues
raised. See Lussier, 343 Md. at 682-700, 684 A.2d at 804-13.
15. See Lussier v. Maryland Racing Comm'n, 100 Md. App. 190,202,640 A.2d 259,
265 (1994), a/I'd, 343 Md. 681, 684 A.2d 804 (1996). For a discussion of the
procedural history of the case, see infra notes 442-52 and accompanying text.
16. See Lussier, 343 Md. at 700, 684 A.2d at 813.
17. See id.
18. See id. at 687-700, 684 A.2d at 807-13.
19. See infra notes 482-508 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 468-508 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 28-161 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 162-266 and accompanying text.
23. See infra notes 267-395 and accompanying text.
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to administrative law and incorporates illustrative examples of Maryland cases. 24 Part V explains the background of Lussier, as well as
the court's holding and rationale. 25 Finally, Part VI analyzes troubling aspects of the court's reasoning and discusses Lussier's potential
impact on Maryland administrative law. 26 The analysis explores how
other states have dealt with analogous issues and concludes with
recommendations to practitioners. 27
II.

FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

A.

Separation of Powers

The first three Articles of the United States Constitution established the legislative,28 executive,29 and judiciapo branches of
America's government. However, the text of the Constitution does
not contain an explicit provision for the separation of powers
among the three branches. 31 Rather, courts have found the requirement of separation of powers implicit in the language used by the
Framers. 32
While the Framers generally agreed that some method of dividing power in the government they were creating was necessary, several different views of what separation of powers meant surfaced
during the Constitutional Convention. 33 Indeed, one scholar asserted that the only thing the Framers agreed on was Madison's
view in Federalist 47, in which Madison explained that separation of
powers "can amount to no more than this, that where the whole
power of one department of the government is exercised by the
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.

See infra notes 267-395 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 396467 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 468-508 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 509-53 and accompanying text.
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1.
See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1.
See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
See 1 KENNETH CULP DAVIS & RICHARD J. PIERCE. JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAw TREATISE § 2.1, at 34 (3d ed. 1994) ("If the Framers decided to incorporate a freestanding separation of powers requirement in the Constitution, that decision
was implicit rather than explicit.").
32. See id.; see also James T. Blanch, Note, The Constitutionality of the False Claims
Acts Qui Tam Provision, 16 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 701, 748 (1993) (" '[T]he
principle of separation of powers was not simply an abstract generalization in
the minds of the Framers: it was woven into the documents that they drafted
in Philadelphia in the summer of 1787.''' (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S.
1, 124 (1976)(alteration in original»).
33. See 1 DAVIS & PIERCE, supra note 31, § 2.1, at 34-35.
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same hands which possess the whole power of another department,
the fundamental principles of a free constitution are subverted."34
Madison emphasized that the principal reason for having a separation of powers provision was to prevent tyranny.35 Thus, the Founding Fathers were aware that separating the government's power was
necessary to preserve a democracy.36
The method the Framers chose to separate governmental
power is evident from the language employed in the first three Articles. Article I of the Constitution established the legislative branch
of the federal government. 37 Article I, section 1 states that" [a] 11 legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the
United States."38 This provision specifically vests the federal government's legislative power in Congress. 39 A principle function of Article I was to ensure that the public's interest would be protected
through a process of deliberation and debate. 40
In Article II, section 1, the Constitution declares that "[ t] he executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United States of
America. "41 Finally, Article III provides that the "judicial Power of
the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in
such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain
and establish. "42 Read together, the provisions in these three Articles have been construed to form the separation of powers
doctrine. 43
While the Constitution clearly did not provide for a fourth coequal branch of government, courts recognized early on that administrative agencies were permissible and necessary.44 The Neces34. Id. § 2.1, at 34 (internal quotation marks omitted).
35. Madison noted: "The accumulation of all powers legislative, executive and judiciary in the same hands, whether of one, a few or many, and whether hereditary, self appointed, or elective, may justly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny." THE FEDERALIST No. 47, at 301 Games Madison) (Garry Wills
ed., 1982).
36. See THE FEDERALIST Nos. 47, 51, at 321 Games Madison), No. 78, at 466 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
37. See U.S. CaNST. art. I, § l.
38. Id.
39. See 1 DAVIS & PIERCE, supra note 31, § 2.6, at 66.
40. SeeAuRED C. AMAN.JR. & WILLIAM T. MArrON, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw 14 (1993).
4l. U.S. CaNST. art. II, § l.
42. U.S. CaNST. art. III, § l.
43. See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 697-98 (1988).
44. See FCC v. Pottsville Broad. Co., 309 U.S. 134, 142 (1940) (noting that administrative agencies have the power to initiate inquiry and control investigations in
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sary and Proper Clause permits Congress to "make all Laws which
shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in
the Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof. "45 This Clause provides the principal constitutional basis for allowing Congress to create and empower administrative
agencies. 46 Thus, the early struggle was not about whether an administrative agency could exist; instead, courts wrestled with the extent to which Congress could delegate powers to these agencies. 47
The nondelegation doctrine came into existence as a result of this
struggle.48
B.

Separation oj Powers and the Nondelegation Doctrine

Conceptually, the separation of powers doctrine prevents one
branch of government from exercising the constitutionally ordained

45.
46.

47.

48.

the arenas of transportation, communication, and other essential public services); Brown v. Warner Holding Co., 50 F. Supp. 593, 597 (D. Minn. 1943)
(explaining that constitutional requirements are met when Congress sets forth
a policy along with standards for its application and then delegates the details
essential to carry out the legislative policy to an administrative agency); Henderson v. Kimmel, 47 F. Supp. 635, 642 & n.lO (D. Kan. 1942) (noting that
Congress may delegate to an administrative agency the power to determine
the details necessary to carry out the legislative purpose).
U.S. CONSf. art. I, § 8, d. 18.
See AMAN & MAYTON, supra note 40, at 11 (explaining that under the Necessary
and Proper Clause, Congress has the authority to create administrative agencies for legislative responsibilities); Deborah Maranville, Nonacquiescence: Outlaw Agencies, Imperial Courts, and the Perils of Pluralism, 39 VAND. L. REv. 471,
523-24 (1986) (explaining that under the Necessary and Proper Clause, Congress has the authority to create administrative agencies for judicial responsibilities) .
See United States v. Rock Royal Co-op., Inc., 307 U.S. 533, 574 (1939). The Supreme Court summarized the long-standing recognition of the legitimacy of
administrative agencies as follows:
From the earliest days the Congress has been compelled to leave
to the administrative officers of the Government authority to determine facts which were to put legislation into effect and the details of
regulations which would implement the more general enactments. It
is well settled, therefore, that it is no argument against the constitutionality of an act to say that it delegates broad powers to executives
to determine the details of any legislative scheme. This necessary authority has never been denied.
Id. (footnote omitted).
See infra notes 49-58 and accompanying text.
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power of a coordinate branch. 49 Technically, administrative agencies
fall within the executive branch of the federal government. 50 From a
purist's perspective, administrative agencies are confined to exercising executive powers.5! Courts have recognized, however, that "a
hermetic sealing off of the three branches of Government from one
another would preclude the establishment of a Nation capable of
governing itself effectively. "52
Separation of powers challenges can arise with respect to each
branch of government and do not require a delegation of power to
occur.53 However, when Congress delegates power to an administrative agency that arguably confers excessive legislative power, a separation of powers issue arises under what courts and commentators
have dubbed the non delegation doctrine. 54 Collectively, commenta49. See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 371-72 (1989) (holding that the
delegation to the United States Sentencing Commission to promulgate sentencing guidelines did not amount to an excessive delegation of legislative
power); see also Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 692 (1892) (holding that "the integrity and maintenance of the system of government ordained by the
[C]onstitution" prevents Congress from delegating its legislative power to another branch).
50. See 2 CHARLES H. KOCH, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAw AND PRACTICE, § 7.11, at 366
(2d ed. 1997) ("Most agencies are 'executive' agencies, those housed in the
executive branch. There are two types of executive agencies: agencies in one
of the cabinet departments and 'independent' executive agencies."); see also
California Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 510 (1972)
(involving an antitrust suit by trucking company against a competitor). The
Court stated that "administrative agencies ... are both creatures of the legislature, and arms of the executive [branch]." Id.
5l. Cf. Bernard Schwartz, Administrative Law Cases During 1985, 38 ADMIN. L. REv.
293, 293 (1986) (noting Attorney General Meese's view that '"quasi-legislative'
or 'quasijudicial' functions [can never] be properly delegated to independent
agencies"). But see 2 KOCH, supra note 50, § 7.10, at 366 ("Administrative law
enthusiasts reject a wooden commitment to separation of powers as they analyze the bureaucracy's place among the 'constitutional' branches.").
52. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 121 (1976) (explaining that although separation
of powers is an essential check against tyranny, the Framers also recognized
that completely separate branches of government would hinder the Nation as
a whole from governing effectively).
53. See generally Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 697 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(" 'In the government of this Commonwealth, the legislative department shall
never exercise the executive and judicial powers, or either of them: The executive shall never exercise the legislative and judicial powers, or either of them:
The judicial shall never exercise the legislative and executive powers, or either
of them: to the end it may be the government of laws and not of men.' "
(quoting MAss. CaNsT. art. XXX».
54. See United States v. Shreveport Grain & Elevator Co., 287 U.S. 77, 85 (1932)
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tors use the terms "delegation doctrine" and "nondelegation doctrine" interchangeably55 to refer to the judicially-created doctrine
that seeks to prevent Congress from divesting itself of its legislative
power. 56 The nondelegation doctrine is merely one method of challenging the government's behavior under the separation of powers
doctrineY However, the nondelegation doctrine broadly encompasses any improper delegation of power among the several
branches of the federal government and their institutions. 58 This

55.

56.
57.

58.

("That the legislative power of Congress cannot be delegated is, of course,
clear."); see also Donald A. Dripps, Delegation and Due Process, 1988 DUKE LJ.
657, 657 (1988) ("Delegation becomes excessive when Congress transfers legislative powers without providing adequate guidance about how those powers
are to be exercised."). Additionally, a separation of powers issue can arise
when an administrative agency is delegated an excessive amount of judicial or
executive power. See Morrison, 487 U.S. at 693 (holding that the independent
counsel provisions of the Ethics in Government Act did not impermissibly interfere with the President's executive powers); Northern Pipeline Constr. Co.
v. Marathon Pipeline Co., 458 U.S. 50, 87 (1982) (holding Congress's delegation of adjudicatory powers to non-Article III bankruptcy judges unconstitutional) .
For example, one commentator noted that Justice Scalia, in commenting on
the Benzene case, said that the" 'delegation doctrine is worth hewing from the
ice.' " David Schoenbrod, Separation of Powers and the Powers That Be: The Constitutional Purposes of the Delegation Doctrine, 36 AM. U. L. REv. 355, 355 (1987)
(quoting Antonin Scalia, A Note on the Benzene Case, 4 REG. 25, 28 (1980».
Justice Rehnquist, in his dispositive concurring opinion in the Benzene case to
which Justice Scalia was referring in his Comments, used the term "nondelegation doctrine" to refer to his opposition to the practice of "Congress['s]
... delegat[ion of] important choices of social policy to politically unresponsive administrators." Industrial Union Dep't v. American Petroleum Inst., 448
U.S. 607, 686-87 (1980) (The Benzene Case). The above-cited sources illustrate
the use of technically different terms in referring to the same issue in the
same context and serve as evidence that they mean the same thing. This Note
will deal with the narrow issue of Congressional delegation of legislative power
and will consistently use the term "nondelegation doctrine" to refer to the recurring question of the proper extent and degree to which Congress may
delegate its power.
See 1 DAVIS & PIERCE, supra note 31, § 2.6, at 66.
See Schoenbrod, supra note 55, at 387 (characterizing the delegation doctrine
as a separation of powers sub-issue in which "two branches consent not to be
separated") .
See 3 KOCH, supra note 50, § 12.13, at 174-75; Misty Ventura, Comment, The
Legislative Veto: A Move Away From Separation of Powers or a Tool to Ensure Nondelegation?, 49 SMU L. REv. 401, 401 (1996) ("The separation of powers doctrine
prevents the accumulation of excessive power in one branch; the nondelegation doctrine prevents one branch from abdicating its authority to another.").
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Note focuses on the narrow category of the non delegation doctrine
issues that arise when Congress delegates legislative power to an administrative agency. Generally, an analysis of this type of nondelegation doctrine issue by a court begins with the statute that grants the
administrative agency its power to regulate-the enabling statute. 59
When Congress passes enabling legislation, it creates the
agency and delineates its regulatory power. 60 The power Congress
confers upon the agency generally includes a grant allowing the
agency to promulgate regulations to carry out certain policy objectives. 61 The power to promulgate regulations-rule making-is often
barely distinguishable from Congress's power to make laws. 62 This
has led courts and commentators to characterize this administrative
rulemaking power as quasi-legislative power.63 Thus, it would appear
as though a separation of powers issue under the nondelegation
doctrine hides within any exercise of quasi-legislative power by an
agency.
A major principle set forth in early Supreme Court opinions
was that" [s]o long as Congress 'shall lay down by legislative act an
intelligible principle to which the person or body authorized to [exercise the delegated authority] is directed to conform, such legislative action is not a forbidden delegation of legislative power.' "64
59. See, e.g., infra notes 77-82 and accompanying text. For an explanation of what
an enabling statute is, see supra note 5.
60. See Werhan, supra note 5, at 569.
61. See Dixon v. United States, 381 U.S. 68, 74 (1965); Manhattan Gen. Equip. Co.
v. Commissioner, 297 U.S. 129, 134 (1936).
62. See Abner S. Greene, Checks and Balances in an Era of Presidential Lawmaking, 61
U. CHI. L. REv. 123, 123 (1994) ("We accept, perhaps uneasily, the delegation
of substantial lawmaking power to the President, who executes the laws he
makes. Of course we don't call the President's power 'lawmaking.' We have
euphemisms-we call this power 'regulatory,' or 'interpretive,' or 'gapfilling.' ").
63. See, e.g., INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 989 (1983) (explaining that the Supreme Court considers rulemaking by administrative agencies to be quasilegislative in nature); Judith K. Meierhenry, The Due Process Right to an Unbiased
Adjudicator in Administrative Proceedings, 36 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 551, 556 (1991).
64. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 372 (1989) (quoting J. w. Hampton,
Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394,409 (1928»; see also Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 84849 (1986) (holding that a
proper delegation of adjudicatory functions must be assessed by reference to
the underlying purpose of the requirements of Article III); Chadha, 462 U.S.
at 954 (holding that although Congress can delegate portions of its powers, it
cannot control administration of its power through a retained veto); Industrial
Union Dep't v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 675 (1980) (Rehn-
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This intelligible principle test is one of several jurisprudential attempts to explain the fundamental concept that congressional delegations must contain legislative standards. 65 In modern times, the
substance of these judicially created legislative standards tests has
imposed a nugatory hurdle in the path of the federal administrative
regime. 66 Administrative agencies churn out regulations with increasing frequency,67 and the federal judiciary has demonstrated a
heightened sense of reluctance to disturb these acts. 68 Before the
federal government reached the administrative state of its present
existence, important precedent developed that continues to influence judicial decisionmaking. 69

C.

The Nondelegation Doctrine in Its Formative Years

In order to survive constitutional scrutiny, early Supreme Court
cases required all delegations of legislative authority to contain standards that guided the agency's exercise of rulemaking powers. 70 In
J W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States,71 the Supreme Court first
enunciated the "intelligible principle" test. 72 The Court stated, "[i]f
Congress shall lay down by legislative act an intelligible principle to
which [an agency] is directed to conform, such legislative action is
not a forbidden delegation of legislative power. "73 Relying on the rationale of the J W. Hampton Court, two subsequent Court decisions

65.

66.
67.

68.

69.
70.
71.
72.
73.

quist, J., concurring) (discussing proper delegations of power, but finding that
a delegation to OSHA of power to adopt appropriate standards of occupational exposure of benzene "would violate the doctrine against uncanalized
delegations") .
See David Schoenbrod, The Delegation Doctrine: Could the Court Give it Substance?,
83 MICH. L. REv. 1223, 1225 (1985) ("Although the Court never disavowed its
1935 decisions and continued to articulate essentially the same delegation test,
it has never again held a statute unconstitutional on the basis of the delegation doctrine.").
See id. at 1231.
See, e.g., United States v. Wooten, 343 F.2d 214, 217 (5th Cir. 1965) (observing
that there are a "mounting number of matters entrusted to the jurisdiction of
... agencies").
See R. George Wright, The Fourteen Faces of Narrowness: How Courts Legitimize
What They Do, 31 Loy. LA. L. REv. 167, 206-07 (1997) ("In the modern regulatory state, broad delegation of authority strikes most federal judges as desirable if not necessary.").
See infra notes 119-37, 498 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 71-99 and accompanying text.
276 U.S. 394 (1928).
See id. at 409.
Id.
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struck down provisions of the National Industrial Recovery Act
(NIRA),14 Both cases dealt with delegations of legislative power by
Congress to the President. 75 However, the standards espoused in
these cases have also been applied to delegations of power by Congress to administrative agencies. 76
In Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan,77 the Supreme Court addressed
section 9(c) of the NIRA.7B Section 9(c) authorized the President to
prohibit the transportation, in interstate and foreign commerce, of
petroleum products produced by any state in excess of certain specified limits.19 The NIRA authorized the President to issue executive
orders to carry out these duties. 8o Any violation of an executive order under the provision was punishable by a fine or imprisonment. 8! However, section 9(c) did not set forth any standard to
guide the President in exercising his authority.82
Recognizing that there had been a purported delegation of legislative power to the President,83 the Court inquired whether "Congress ha[d] declared a policy with respect to that subject; whether
the Congress ha[d] set up a standard for the President's action;
whether the Congress ha[d] required any finding by the President
in the exercise of the authority to enact the prohibition."84 The
Court noted that "Congress ha[d] declared no policy, ha[d] established no standard, [and] ha[d] laid down no rule" to guide the
74. See infra notes 77-99 and accompanying text.
75. See infra notes 77-99 and accompanying text.
76. See infra note 136 and accompanying text.
77. 293 U.S. 388 (1935).
78. See id. at 406. In subsection c, the statute provided:
The President is authorized to prohibit the transportation in interstate and foreign commerce of petroleum and the products
thereof produced or withdrawn from storage in excess of the amount
permitted to be produced or withdrawn from storage by any State
law or valid regulation or order prescribed thereunder, by any board,
commission, officer, or other duly authorized agency of a State.
Any violation of any order of the President issued under the provisions of this subsection shall be punishable by fine of not to exceed
$1,000, or imprisonment for not to exceed six months, or both.
Id. (quoting 15 U.S.c. § 709(c) (1933».
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.

See
See
See
See
See

id.
id. at 406-07.
id.
id. at 415.
id. at 414.
84. Id. at 415.
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President's discretion. 85 The Court concluded that section 9(c) was
an unconstitutional delegation of legislative powers. 86 The Panama
Refining Court reasoned that although there was a "declaration of
policy, "87 there were neither guiding policies nor standards to prevent arbitrary enforcement. 88
Similarly, in Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States,89 the Supreme
Court voided another section of the NIRA as violative of the
nondelegation doctrine. 9o In Schechter, the petitioners were convicted
of eighteen counts of violating the Live Poultry Code,91 which was
85. [d. at 430.
86. See id. at 433.

87. [d. at 416 (internal quotation marks omitted).
88. See id. at 415-33. Justice Cardozo, in his dissent, conceded the importance of a
standard to guide discretion in enforcing the terms of the Act. See id. at 434

(Cardozo, j., dissenting). However, Justice Cardozo disagreed with the majority's opinion that inadequate standards existed. See id. (Cardozo, j., dissenting). Justice Cardozo contended that the President's discretion was curtailed
by the structure of the Act and that it would be reasonable to import standards from other statutes. See id.
89. 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
90. See id. at 550-51.
91. See id. at 519. Section 3(a) provided:
"Upon the application to the President by one or more trade or
industrial associations or groups, the President may approve a code
or codes of fair competition for the trade or industry or subdivision
thereof, represented by the applicant or applicants, if the President
finds (1) that such associations or groups impose no inequitable restrictions on admission to membership therein and are truly representative of such trades or industries or subdivisions thereof, and (2)
that such code or codes are not designed to promote monopolies or
to eliminate or oppress small enterprises and will not operate to discriminate against them, and will tend to effectuate the policy of this
title: Provided, That such code or codes shall not permit monopolies
or monopolistic practices: Provided further, That where such code or
codes affect the services and welfare of persons engaged in other
steps of the economic process, nothing in this section shall deprive
such persons of the right to be heard prior to approval by the President of such code or codes. The President may, as a condition of his
approval of any such code, impose such conditions (including requirements for the making of reports and the keeping of accounts)
for the protection of consumers, competitors, employees, and others,
and in furtherance of the public interest, and may provide such exceptions to and exemptions from the provisions of such code, as the
President in his discretion deems necessary to effectuate the policy
herein declared."
[d. (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 703 (1933».
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promulgated pursuant to section 3 of the NIRA.92 Section 3 allowed
the President to promulgate "codes of fair competition" and take
any other measures to effectuate the broad goals set forth in section
1 of the NIRA.93 The petitioners argued that it was unconstitutional
because the President was bound by no standards in exercising this
power. 94
The Court relied on Panama Refining to determine the validity
of the legislative delegation. 95 The Court explained that a legislative
delegation must operate "within prescribed limits."96 The Schechter
Court emphasized that the statute which delegated power to the
President failed to describe its subject,97 beyond insuring fair competition. 98 The Schechter Court held that the delegation was unconstitutional because it failed to set standards to guide the President in
creating the codes of fair competition. 99
Although Panama Refining and Schechter have not been overruled, some commentators categorize these cases as "doubtful
precedents."100 Since these cases, Supreme Court decisions have invariably permitted even the broadest delegations of power. 101 Moreover; the Supreme Court has consistently upheld delegations, even
when power was conferred with minimal or no standards
whatsoever. 102
Nothing spurred the growth of the administrative state more
than President Franklin Roosevelt's New Deal. 103 Today, it is a well92. See id.
93. Id. at 521 n.4.
94. See id. at 538-39.
95. See id. at 529-30.
96. Id. at 530.
97. See id. at 530-31. In Panama Refining, the subject described in the Act was the
prevention of the transportation of "hot oil" in interstate commerce. See Panama Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388,430 (1935).
98. See Schechter, 295 U.S. at 530.
99. See id. at 54142.
100. 1 JACOB A. STEIN ET AL .• ADMINISTRATIVE LAw § 3.03[1], at 3-70 (Matthew
Bender ed., 1998).
101. See id. at 3-77.
102. See Uwe Kischel, Delegation of Legislative Power to Agencies: A Comparative Analysis
of United States and German Law, 46 ADMIN. L. REv. 213, 220 (1994) (noting that
after Schechter and Panama Refining, the Supreme Court has not "use[d] the
delegation doctrine to strike down any statutes enacted by Congress"); see also,
e.g., Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 426 (1944) (upholding the validity of
the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942 that contained minimal safeguards).
103. See Michael J. Klarman, Antifidelity, 70 S. CAL. L. REv. 381, 412-13 ("The Constitution's tripartite division of powers . . . has been largely eviscerated in the
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recognized reality that the legislative and judicial branches are illsuited to perform many of the day-to-day functions required of the
government. 104 From the New Deal Era to present day, the administrative bureaucracy in the federal government has grown exponentially, taking on a life of its own.105 Indeed, one scholar noted that,
"[t]he size and scope of federal administrative activity has increased
during every period in the nation's history."I06
The Supreme Court has facilitated the growth of federal agency
power by practically eliminating the requirement of meaningful
standards to curtail an agency's rulemaking authority.I07 Mter
Schechter and Panama Refining, the Supreme Court has not struck
down a delegation of power by Congress to the executive branch on
constitutional grounds. lOS As federal law developed, the Supreme
Court has upheld increasingly broad delegations of legislative power
to administrative agencies. 109
Courts and scholars have identified several reasons that justified
and arguably necessitated the need for relaxing the nondelegation
doctrine. I10 Administrative agency decisionmaking is often more cost
effective. 1I1 Additionally, many governmental policy decisions involve
intricate issues that are more aptly dealt with by expert administrative agencies. 112 This expertise is particularly necessary in areas that

104.
105.

106.
107.

108.
109.
110.
111.
112.

twentieth century in order to accommodate the exponential growth of the
modern administrative state."); Ventura, supra note 58, at 402 n.8 ("This regulatory authority [granted to administrative agencies] has grown exponentially
since World War II . . . .").
See Peter Marra, Have Administrative Agencies Abandoned Reasonability?, 6 SETON
HALL CONST. LJ. 763, 772, 777 (1996).
See Henry G. Manne, The Judiciary and Free Markets, 21 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'y
11, 23 (1997) ("The most powerful source of the dilution of the older structure in American law was the growth, particularly during and after the 'New
Deal' in the 1930's, of vast amounts of regulatory legislation and the enormous growth of administrative law . . . . "); Werhan, supra note 5, at 574-75.
1 DAVIS & PIERCE, supra note 31, § 1.3, at 6.
See, e.g., American Textile Mfrs. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490 (1981) (allowing
OSHA to promulgate regulations regarding toxic materials or harmful physical agents under a mere "feasibility standard").
See 1 DAVIS & PIERCE, supra note 31, § 2.6, at 73 ("The Court has not held a
delegation unconstitutional since 1935.").
See, e.g., Donovan, 452 U.S. at 490.
See infra notes 111-13, 139-41 and accompanying text.
See AMA.N & MAYfON, supra note 40, at 10.
See Charles H. Koch, Jr., An Issue-Driven Strategy for Review of Agency Decisions, 43
ADMIN. L. REv. 511, 516 (1991) (noting that "agencies embody special expertise" such as "superior capacity for compiling the information" and
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evolve rapidly and require flexibility.ll3
While it became widely accepted that Congress could delegate
portions of its lawmaking power, the constitutional principle behind
the separation of powers and non delegation doctrines remained a
constant. 114 Even though the nondelegation doctrine may have experienced a liberalization, it still forbids complete divestment of lawmaking power to an unrestrained agency.llS Standards used to curtail excessive delegations of power, such as the intelligible principle
test, exist primarily because administrative agencies, unlike Congress, lack a fundamental constitutional protective device-political
accountability.116 While the intelligible principle test was one of the
more prevalent standards the Supreme Court used to decide
whether an unconstitutional delegation of power occurred 117 after

113.

114.

115.

116.

117.

"synthesiz[ing] the information"); Marra, supra note 104, at 767 ("The justifications for the delegation of congressional power to administrative agencies
include Congress's inability to handle technical issues and act efficiently and
effectively.") .
See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 372 (1989). In Mistretta, the Supreme Court explained the necessity of the non delegation docuine as follows:
"Our jurisprudence has been driven by a practical understanding that in our
increasingly complex society, replete with ever changing and more technical
problems, Congress simply cannot do its job absent an ability to delegate
power under broad general directives." Id.; see also AMAN & MAYTON, supra
note 40, at 11.
See 1 DAVIS & PIERCE, supra note 31, § 2.6, at 69-70 ("For two centuries, the Supreme Court has struggled to reconcile this routine congressional practice
with the Court's oft-stated belief that Article I prohibits Congress from delegating legislative power.").
See National Cable Television Assoc. v. United States, 415 U.S. 336, 342 (1974)
(citing A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 529
(1935».
See AMAN & MAYTON, supra note 40, at 14 (noting that basic choices cannot be
passed to agencies because agencies are not "politically responsible officials");
Christopher T. Handman, Note, The Doctrine of Political Accountability and Supreme Court Jurisdiction: Applying a New External Constraint to Congress's Exceptions
Clause Power, 106 YALE LJ. 197, 200 (1996) (noting that Congress's diminished
accountability to the electorate by delegating powers to administrative agencies has led many courts and commentators to conclude that unaccountable
legislation is unconstitutional legislation); David A. Herrman, Comment, To
Delegate or Not to Delegate-That Is the Preemption: The Lack of Political Accountability
in Administrative Preemption Defies Federalism Constraints on Government Power, 28
PAC. LJ. 1157, 1170 (1997) (explaining that administrative agencies cannot
have unrestrained power to formulate laws because they are unelected and are
not politically accountable).
See]. W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394,409 (1928) (holding that the delegation of legislative power to an administrative agency will be
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1936 the Court seemed to abandon it in large part. 118
In the early 1980's, it appeared as though a trend toward the
re-establishment of the legislative standards requirement began to
develop in Supreme Court jurisprudence. 1I9 Notably, Justice Rehnquist called for a return to more stringent nondelegation principles
such as those first espoused by Chief Justice Taft in J W. Hampton. 120
Justice Rehnquist's philosophical approach to the nondelegation
doctrine was first articulated in his concurring opinion in Industrial
Union Department v. American Petroleum Institute,121 and later in his dissenting opinion in American Textile Manufacturers Institute, Inc. v.
Donovan. 122
In American Petroleum, Justice Rehnquist recognized that" [t]he
rule against delegation of legislative power is not ... so cardinal [a]
principle as to allow for no exception."123 Justice Rehnquist explained that Congress may "lay down the general policy and standards that animate the law," while permitting an executive agency
to "refine those standards, fill in the blanks, or apply the standards
to particular cases."124 However, Justice Rehnquist emphasized that
the constitutionality of a delegation of legislative power "must be
judged according to common sense and the inherent necessities of
governmental coordination."125 According to Justice Rehnquist, the
delegation in American Petroleum was unconstitutional because Congress did not set forth any ascertainable standard to guide the Secretary of Labor in promulgating a benzene exposure limit under
OSHA.126 American Petroleum illustrates what one scholar described to
upheld if Congress established an intelligible principle to direct the agency).
118. See Schoenbrod, supra note 65, at 1231 (noting that the intelligible principle
test became "so ephemeral and elastic as to lose its meaning").
119. See infra notes 123-27 and accompanying text.
120. For a discussion of the intelligible principle test as enumerated by the J W.
Hampton Court, see supra notes 71-73 and accompanying text.
121. 448 U.S. 607, 675-76 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., concurring) (noting that a standard-less delegation to the Secretary of Labor to establish certain OSHA requirements "would violate the doctrine against uncanalized delegations of legislative power").
122. 452 U.S. 490, 545, 548 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (arguing that a '"feasibility standard' is no standard at all;" therefore, a Congressional act delegating to the Secretary of Labor the power to promulgate an OSHA cotton dust
regulation was an unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority).
123. American Petroleum, 448 U.S. at 673.
124. Id. at 675 (internal quotation marks omitted).
125. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
126. See id. at 675-77.
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be Justice Rehnquist's "distaste for open-ended delegations" of legislative authority. 127
Additionally, a recent majority opinion by the Supreme Court
seemed to indicate an overall resurgence in the nondelegation doctrine's legislative standards requirement. Toully v. United States128 appears to depart from post-1936 delegation doctrine precedent and
return to the intelligible principle test espoused in J W. Hampton. 129
In Toully, the Supreme Court considered whether a provision of the
Controlled Substances Act "unconstitutionally delegate[d] legislative
power to the Attorney General." 130 The purpose of the Act was to
establish "an expedited procedure by which the Attorney General
[could] schedule a substance on a temporary basis when doing so
[was] necessary to avoid an imminent hazard to the public safety."131
In its rationale, the Supreme Court stated "that the nondelegation doctrine does not prevent Congress from seeking assistance,
within proper limits, from its coordinate Branches." 132 Congress can
"legislate [] in broad terms" provided the legislation contains " 'intelligible principle[s]' " that serve as guideposts for those individuals or bodies entrusted to carry out the legislative directive. 133 The
Court found, however, that "one [could not] plausibly argue that §
201 (h) 's 'imminent hazard to the public safety' standard [was] not
an intelligible principle."134
The Toully Court declined to hold that "something more than
an 'intelligible principle' is required when Congress authorizes another branch of government to promulgate regulations that contemplate criminal sanctions."135 Moreover, the Supreme Court observed
that the delegation was constitutional because it meaningfully constrained the Attorney General by placing specific restrictions on his
discretion to define criminal conduct. 136 Although the Supreme
127. Schoenbrod, supra note 65, at 1231 n.39.
128. 500 u.s. 160 (1991).
129. See id. at 165; see also supra notes 71-73 and accompanying text.
1~0. Touby, 500 U.S. at 162.
131. Id. at 163 (internal quotation marks omitted).
132. Id. at 165 (citing Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 372 (1989».
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 166-67.
136. See id. at 167-69. In Touby, the Supreme Court rejected three challenges to the
constitutionality of the Controlled Substances Act. See id. at 165-69. First, petitioners argued that the statute violated separation of powers by granting the
Attorney General too much power. See id. at 167. Petitioners claimed that
while Congress could delegate the power to schedule drugs to the Executive
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Court favorably quoted the "intelligible principle" test, the Court
did not strictly apply it in Touby as it had in Schechter and Panama
Refining. 137
Indeed, Touby, rather than marking the resurgence of the
nondelegation doctrine, looks to have marked its demiseps The
Court appears to have retreated from strictly applying the nondelegation doctrine for three reasons:
First, they seem to have recognized the extreme difficulty of
creating a justiciable standard that would allow judges to
distinguish between constitutional and unconstitutional
delegations. Second, they seem to have adopted a more realistic perspective on the legislative process. Third, the Justices are less concerned about broad delegations to agencies
because they now recognize that agencies are politically accountable institutions of govemment. 139
Acknowledging this last reason, a unanimous Court observed in
Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,l40 that
"[w]hile agencies are not directly accountable to the people, the
Chief Executive is, and it is entirely appropriate for this political

137.

138.
139.
140.

Branch, the Attorney General could not be the recipient of that power since
the Attorney General also has the power to prosecute drug offenses. See id. In
response, the Supreme Court held that the petitioners' argument did not implicate the separation of powers doctrine because the doctrine does not concern itself with the distribution of power within a single branch. See id. at 16768.
Second, the Court rejected the argument that the statute was unconstitutional because it barred judicial review, noting that in a separate section, the
Act specifically permitted judicial review. See id. Finally, the Court disposed of
petitioners' third challenge and held that the Attorney General's delegation of
his temporary scheduling power to the DEA was constitutional because Congress did not limit the Attorney General's delegation authority in the Act. See
id. at 169.
Compare id. at 165 (finding that "imminent hazard to the public safety" was an
"intelligible principle"), with A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States,
295 U.S. 495, 550 (1935) (noting that codes of fair competition failed to provide guidance to the President), and Panama Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388,
407 (1935) (concluding that the statute authorizing the President "to prescribe such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the purposes of Title I of the [NlRA]" lacked sufficient guidance).
See 1 DAVIS & PIERCE, supra note 31, § 2.6, at 76.
[d.
467 U.S. 837 (1984).
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branch of the Government to make such policy choices."141 While
the nondelegation doctrine may ring hollow, the Court has not
abandoned its scrutiny of administrative agencies.
In fact, the void created by the impotence of the nondelegation
doctrine has been filled by the development of other protective
mechanisms. 142 First, courts now strive to place substantive limitations on over-broad, vague, or standard-less laws. 143 Second, courts
require "reasoned consistency" in agency decisionmaking. l44 The final mechanism imposed by federal courts is the use of procedural
safeguards to protect against abuses of discretion. 145 Nevertheless,
no matter how many procedures an agency employs during its
rulemaking process, if the power is conveyed in an unconditional
delegation of Congress's lawmaking function, the statute cannot be
cured. 146
D.

Nondelegation Analysis Through Statutory Construction

Another prevalent method courts employ to avoid invalidating
a statute on nondelegation grounds is the canon of judicial restraint. 147 This canon requires a court to abstain from basing its rul- .
ing on constitutional grounds if another non-constitutional basis for
the decision exists. 148 By invoking the canon of judicial restraint, a
141. [d. at 865.
142. See STEIN ET AL, supra note 100, § 3.03[1], at 3-97 to 3-99.
143. See, e.g., Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 130 (1958) (holding that absent explicit

144.
145.
146.
147.

148.

authority to deny passports to citizens based on "their beliefs or associations,"
the Secretary of State could "not employ that standard to restrict the citizens'
right of free movement").
Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of Administrative Law, 88 HARv. L. REv.
1669, 1679 (1975).
See id. at 1679.
See AMAN & MAYTON, supra note 40, § 1.4, at 37.
See Three Affiliated Tribes v. Wold Eng'g, P.C., 467 U.S. 138, 157-58 (1984); see
also Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 191 (1991) ("This canon is followed out of
respect for Congress, which we assume legislates in the light of constitutional
limitations."); Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr.
Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 575 (1988) (" [W]here an otherwise acceptable
construction of a statute would raise serious constitutional problems, the
Court will construe the statute to avoid such problems unless such construction is plainly contrary to the intent of Congress."); Industrial Union Dep't v.
American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 646 (1980) (reasoning that it is more
favorable to construe a statute to avoid finding a "sweeping delegation of legislative power"); 3 KOCH, supra note 50, § 12.11[3], at 162-63.
See Three Affiliated Tribes, 467 U.S. at 157-58; see also American Petroleum, 448 U.S.
at 646; 3 KOCH, supra note 50, § 12.11[3], at 162-63.
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court can resolve a challenge asserted under the non delegation doctrine by applying a narrow construction to the enabling statute to
void the specific regulation promulgated by the agency.149 The court
avoids the constitutional issue by holding that the regulation
promulgated by the agency exceeded the power conferred to it by
the enabling statute. 150 Instead of rendering the entire enabling statute unconstitutional, the court strikes only the particular agency
power asserted. 151 This method of analysis enables a court to curtail
excessive agency power, but on statutory construction grounds. 152
Often the enabling statute at issue is broad and the agency
could reasonably interpret it to permit the regulation adopted. 153
The claimant challenging the delegation will assert that the power
conveyed was overly broad and violative of the nondelegation doctrine. 154 A reviewing court will then proceed through traditional canons of statutory construction. 155 Assuming Congress intended that
the agency could promulgate the regulation at issue, the court will
decide whether allowing this construction would violate the
nondelegation doctrine. 156 If upholding the regulation would violate
the nondelegation doctrine, the court will infer that Congress
would not have intended to delegate the particular power involved. 157 Accordingly, the court will conclude that the agency went
beyond the scope of its enabling act. 158
It would behoove a litigant to juxtapose any non delegation doctrine challenge with the canon of judicial restraint. By itself, the
nondelegation doctrine will rarely provide a basis for a court to pre149. See American Petroleum, 448 U.S. at 646; see also 3 KOCH, supra note 50, §
12.11 [3], at 162-63.
150. See American Petroleum, 448 U.S. at 646; see also 3 KOCH, supra note 50, §
12.11[3], at 162-63.
151. See American Petroleum, 448 U.S. at 646 (narrowing the statutory language so as
to avoid violating the non delegation doctrine); see also 3 Koch, supra note 50,
§ 12.13[5], at 179-80.
152. See American Petroleum, 448 U.S. at 646; see also 3 KOCH, supra note 50, §
12.13[5], at 180.
153. See Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 184-91 (1991); American Petroleum, 448 U.S. at
64041.
154. See AMAN & MAYTON, supra note 40, at 20 (citing NBC v. United States, 319
U.S. 190, 211-U (1943».
155. See id. at 15 (citing American Petroleum, 448 U.S. at 607).
156. See American Petroleum, 448 U.S. at 639-40; National Cable Television Assoc. v.
United States, 415 U.S. 336, 342-44 (1974).
157. See American Petroleum, 448 U.S. at 645; National Cable Television, 415 U.S. at 34344.
158. See American Petroleum, 448 U.S. at 663-64.
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vent an agency from exercising broad rule making power. 159 When
combined with a statutory construction analysis premised upon the
canon of judicial restraint, however, the nondelegation doctrine remains a viable method of curtailing broad delegations of power to
agencies. 160 In essence, the principles behind the non delegation
doctrine are now employed to infer congressional intent. 161
III.

STATE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

State constitutions contain three types of separation of powers
provisions. 162 Twenty-seven state constitutions, including Maryland's,163 contain the most restrictive type of separation of powers
clause. l64 These restrictive separation of power clauses include an
express separation of powers provision coupled with an additional
clause that explicidy prohibits "any person belonging to or exercising power under any branch from . . . exercising any power or
function belonging to another."165 Twelve state constitutions contain
separation of powers provisions expressly stating that the governmental powers shall be separate. 166 Ten state constitutions resemble
the provisions in the United States Constitution and implicidy incorporate the separation of powers provision by establishing three
branches of government and according each branch specific
powers. 167
The various separation of powers provisions have led to differing approaches to non delegation issues by state courts. One com159.
160.
16l.
162.

163.

164.
165.

166.
167.

See supra note 108 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 147-58 and accompanying text.
See supra note 157 and accompanying text.
See John Devlin, Toward a State Constitutional Analysis of Allocation of Powers: Legislators and Legislative Appointees Performing Administrative Functions, 66 TEMP. L.
REv. 1205, 1236-37 (1993).
Maryland's separation of powers provision provides: "That the Legislative, Executive and Judicial powers of Government ought to be forever separate and
distinct from each other; and no person exercising the functions of one of
said Departments shall assume or discharge the duties of any other." MD.
CODE ANN., CONST., DECLARATION OF RIGHTS art. 8 (1998).
See Devlin, supra note 162, at 1237.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Louisiana's state constitution is similar
to these twenty-seven states in that it contains an express separation of powers
provision and an additional limiting clause. See id. at 1237 & n.1l2. Louisiana's
limiting clause provides that "no one of these branches, nor any person holding office in one of them, shall exercise power belonging to either of the
others." Id. at n.1l2.
See id. at 1236.
See id.
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mentator has identified three categories of nondelegation doctrine
approaches. 168 The first category consists of states with the strictest
non delegation doctrine jurisprudence-delegations of legislative
power must be accompanied by "strict" standards and safeguards. 169
This rule requires that statutes contain definite and clear standards
to control the agency's decision making process. 170 There are eighteen states that subscribe to this view. 171
States in the second category-the "loose" standard and safeguard category-require their legislatures to set forth general rules
in their enabling statutes in order to curtail agency discretion. 172
These jurisdictions require guiding principles to take the form of either general legislative standards or procedural safeguards, or a
combination of both.173 Twenty-four states apply these general
requirements. 174
168. See Gary J. Greco, Survey, Standards (Yf Safeguards: A Survey of the Delegation Doctrine in the States, 8 ADMIN. LJ. AM. U. 567, 579-80 (1994). The author cataloged
not only the standards that each state applies, but the cases adopting the standards requirement. See id.
169. See id. at 580. The author notes that the requirement of standards and safeguards is based on a policy that the legislature should not avoid its political
responsibility by delegating its lawmaking authority. See id.
170. See id.
171. See id. at 581-84 (citing Askew v. Cross Key Waterways, 372 So. 2d 913, 918-19
(Fla. 1978) (requiring a statute to provide strict standards); Guillou v. Division
of Motor Vehicles, 503 A.2d 838, 84042 (N.H. 1986) (requiring a statute to
provide a general policy and prescribe specific standards); Boreali v. Axelrod,
517 N.E.2d 1350, 1354 (N.Y 1987) (requiring a statute to provide reasonable
safeguards and standards); Blue Cross of Northeast Ohio v. Ratchford, 416
N.E.2d 614, 618 (Ohio 1980) (requiring a statute to provide practical standards or an "intelligible principle"); Commonwealth v. Sessoms, 532 A.2d 775,
784 (Pa. 1987) (Papadikos, J., concurring) (requiring a statute to provide limits on an agency's powers and establish procedures to govern their decisionmaking); Chapel v. Commonwealth, 89 S.E.2d 337, 342 (Va. 1955) (requiring
that a statute fIx a standard to guide the agency in rulemaking); State ex reL
Barker v. Manchin, 279 S.E.2d 622, 631 (W. Va. 1981) (requiring that a statute
must provide sufficient standards for guidance».
172. See id. at 588.
173. See id.
174. See id. at 588-92 (citing Connecticut v. Campbell, 617 A.2d 889, 895 (Conn.
1992) (requiring that standards be as defInite as is reasonably practical under
the circumstances); Atlantis I Condominium Ass'n v. Bryson, 403 A.2d 711, 713
(Del. 1979) (noting that a court will focus on totality of protections against arbitrariness including both standards and safeguards); Department of Transp. v.
City of Atlanta, 398 S.E.2d 567, 571-72 (Ga. 1990) (noting that legislature must
provide sufficient guidelines); People v. Turmon, 340 N.W.2d 620, 623 (Mich.
1983) (requiring that statutes provide standards that are as reasonably precise
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The final category is the procedural safeguard category.175
Under the procedural safeguards test, courts focus on whether the
legislature has created procedural safeguards in determining
whether the enabling statute was an unconstitutional delegation of
power. 176 States in this category grant their administrative agencies
wide discretion in determining policy and writing regulations. 177
There are six states that subscribe to the procedural safeguards requirement. 178 The commentator that set forth these categories identified Maryland as falling within this procedural safeguards category.179 The following analysis illustrates the present state of the
nondelegation doctrine in Maryland.

A.

Maryland Administrative Law

Until Lussier, the Court of Appeals of Maryland had addressed
essentially two primary issues in cases concerning the extent of
power the Maryland General Assembly bestowed on administrative
agencies under broad statutory grants of authority.180 The first issue
was whether the Maryland General Assembly could constitutionally
delegate its power. 181 The second issue involved a statutory construction analysis that was aimed at determining the extent of power the
General Assembly actually intended to convey to the agency.182 Both

175.
176.
177.
178.

179.
180.
181.
182.

as the subject matter permits); Township of Mount Laurel v. Department of
Pub. Advocate, 416 A.2d 886, 891 (NJ. 1980) (requiring that statutes contain
sufficient standards); Adams v. North Carolina Dep't of Natural Resources, 249
S.E.2d 402, 410-11 (N.C. 1978) (noting that if the legislature provides general
policies or guidelines, detailed standards are not necessary».
See id. at 598.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 598-99 (citing People v. Wright, 639 P.2d 267, 271 (Cal. 1982) (noting
that reasonable grants of powers to agencies are permissible so long as suitable safeguards are established); Meyer v. Lord, 586 P.2d 367, 371 (Or. Ct. App.
1978) (noting that the determining factor for ruling on the constitutionality
of a delegation is whether adequate administrative safeguards exist); Barry &
Barry, Inc. v. State, 500 P.2d 540, 54243 (Wash. 1972) (noting that the statute
should contain a general standard advising the agency of what to do and must
provide adequate procedural safeguards».
See id. at 598-99 (citing Department of Transp. v. Armacost, 311 Md. 64, 532
A.2d 1056 (1987».
See infra notes 192-395 and accompanying text.
For a discussion of Maryland cases addressing constitutional issues, see infra
notes 192-262 and accompanying text.
For a discussion of Maryland cases addressing statutory construction issues,
see infra notes 276-395 and accompanying text.
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categories of issues are explored in the following subsections.
1.

Separation of Powers and the Nondelegation Doctrine
Maryland

III

While Maryland is not bound by the doctrine of separation of
powers that has developed under the federal Constitution,183
Maryland courts have articulated analogous principles. Article 8 of
the Maryland Declaration of Rights provides that "the Legislative,
Executive and Judicial powers of Government ought to be forever
separate."I84 Thus, unlike the federal Constitution, Maryland's Constitution contains an explicit reference to the separation of powers.185 Any delegation of legislative or judicial power to an administrative agency appears to contradict Article 8 because, in theory,
administrative agencies fall under the executive branch. 186 Nonetheless, the Court of Appeals of Maryland has recognized the right of
the General Assembly to delegate legislative powers to administrative agencies for over 125 years. 187 As the court of appeals has construed Article 8, the separation of powers doctrine does not act as a
complete bar to the transfer of power among the three branches of
government. 188
183. See Richard A. Schapiro, Contingency and Universalism in the State Separation of
Powers Discourse, 4 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REv. 79. 79 (1998) ("State courts
clearly have the power to diverge from federal doctrine in construing their
states' constitutions .... ").
184. MD. CODE ANN., CaNST., DECLARATION OF RIGHTS art. 8 (1998).
185. See Maryland State Police v. Warwick Supply & Equip. Co., 330 Md. 474, 480,
624 A.2d 1238, 1241 (1993) (distinguishing the explicit reference to the separation of powers doctrine in Maryland's Constitution from the implicitly recognized doctrine in the federal Constitution).
186. See Lussier v. Maryland Racing Comm'n, 343 Md. 681, 702-03, 648 A.2d 804,
814 (1996) (Bell, J., dissenting). In his dissent, Judge Bell noted that the ability to promulgate a regulation imposing a fine is a legislative function. See id.
at 702, 648 A.2d at 814 (Bell, j., dissenting). The ability to impose the fine is a
judicial function. See id. (Bell j., dissenting). However, the delegation was not
unconstitutional as violative of the separation of powers bar between the executive and the judiciary because the enabling statute provided for judicial review of the punishment. See id. at 707, 684 A.2d at 817 (Bell, j., dissenting).
187. See id. at 706, 684 A.2d at 816 (Bell, j., dissenting); see also Harrison v. Mayor
of Baltimore, 1 Gill 264, 276-77 (1843) (noting that, by incorporating the
Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, "the corporate authorities were clothed
with all the legislative powers which the General Assembly could have exerted").
188. See Lussier, 343 Md. at 706, 684 A.2d at 816 (Bell, j., dissenting) (citing Department of Natural Resources v. Linchester Sand & Gravel Corp., 274 Md. 211,
220,334 A.2d 514, 521 (1975».
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As with the federal courts, Maryland courts have adopted and
developed their own non delegation doctrine jurisprudence that regulates the transfer of power from the General Assembly to administrative agencies. 189 The Court of Appeals of Maryland has aptly recognized that "[ t] he delegation doctrine . . . is a corollary of the
separation of powers doctrine."19o Thus, Maryland's nondelegation
doctrine curtails violations of Maryland's constitutional separation of
powers doctrine. 191

a.

The Adequate Legislative Standards Requirement

Originally, Maryland courts required the General Assembly to
provide adequate legislative standards in all enabling statutes in order to prevent arbitrary enforcement by administrative agencies. l92
Early courts recognized that legislative standards were necessary "because the omission to prescribe reasonably definite standards for
the exercise of such an authority might result in arbitrary discriminations."193 Therefore, analogous to the federal precedent discussed
in Section II, the initial inquiry in a nondelegation doctrine challenge in Maryland focuses on the legislative standards supplied by
the General Assembly in the particular enabling statute at issue. 194
However, early Maryland case law began to erode this strict standards requirement.
189. See Warwick, 330 Md. at 480,624 A.2d at 1241 (explaining that "[t]he delegation doctrine prohibits a legislative body from delegating its law-making function to any other branch of government or entity and is a corollary of the separation of powers doctrine implicit in the United States Constitution and
expressly provided in the Maryland Constitution").
190. Department of Transp. v. Armacost, 311 Md. 64, 77, 532 A.2d 1056, 1062
(1987).
191. In Maryland, the separation of powers provision requires that legislative and
executive authority must be separate. See MD. CODE ANN., CaNST., DECLARATION
OF RIGHTS art. 8 (1998). This provision acts as a bar to the sharing of power
between branches, unless the judiciary creates an exception.
192. See, e.g., Schneider v. Pullen, 198 Md. 64, 69-70, 81 A.2d 226, 229 (1951) (addressing the sufficiency of legislative standards to survive constitutional scrutiny); Baltimore v. Bloecher & Schaff, Inc., 149 Md. 648, 656, 132 A. 160, 16465 (1926) (considering whether "unfit for human food" was an adequate standard).
193. County Comm'rs of Prince George's County v. Northwest Cemetery Co., 160
Md. 653, 656, 154 A. 452, 453 (1931) (invalidating a statute conferring unbridled discretion upon county commissioners to permit or proscribe the establishment of a cemetery).
194. See supra notes 64-{j9 and accompanying text.
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Areas in Which the Legislative Standards Requirement Has Eroded

In Givner v. Commissioner of Health,195 the court of appeals relaxed the requirement for a legislative standard when a statute conferred powers relating to areas of public health. 196 In Givner, a landlord brought suit against the Commissioner of Health of Baltimore
City seeking a decree declaring unconstitutional a regulation concerning bathing facilities in dwelling units. 197
The issue was whether the enabling legislation was sufficiently
definite as "to guide the [agency] in ascertaining the basic facts
upon which [its] regulations were predicated."198 The Givner court
began its analysis by documenting areas of administrative law where
the nondelegation doctrine had been relaxed such as zoning, redevelopment, and public health cases. 199 As with these areas, the court
of appeals concluded that a statute enabling an agency to regulate
the area of "public health" should be treated more liberally by
courts engaging in a constitutional non delegation doctrine analysis. 2OO The court explained that agencies regulating the area of public health should be accorded broader quasi-legislative discretion because "there is a practical necessity for expert interpretation in its
application to concrete situations.''201 The court, however, did not
provide a specific test for determining if a particular legislative standard provided enough guidance to survive a non delegation doctrine
challenge.

c.

The Safeguards Component

Early Maryland precedent emphasized the legislative standards
requirement-powers delegated to an administrative agency must
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.

207 Md. 184, 113 A.2d 899 (1955).
See id. at 184, 113 A.2d at 899.
See id. at 187-90, 113 A.2d at 900-01.
[d. at 191, 113 A.2d at 902.
See id. The court noted that the trend of administrative law cases allowing relaxed standards started with zoning cases. See id. The court pointed to Heath v.
Mayor of Baltimore, 187 Md. 296, 303, 49 A.2d 799, 803 (1946), and Montgomery
County v. Mcrlands Club, 202 Md. 279, 287, 96 A.2d 261, 264 (1953), to support
this proposition. The court also noted a trend to loosen the standards requirement in both redevelopment cases and public health cases. See Givncr, 207 Md.
at 191-92, 113 A.2d at 902-03.
200. See Givncr, 207 Md. at 192, 113 A.2d at 902. The statute at issue directed the
Commissioner of Health to " 'cause all ordinances for the preservation of the
health of the inhabitants of Baltimore City to be faithfully executed and
strictly observed.' " [d. at 189, 113 A.2d at 901.
201. [d. at 191, 113 A.2d at 902.
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contain adequate legislative standards to prevent an abuse of discretion. 202 As case law developed, however, so did the court's inquiry.
Specifically, courts added an alternative "safeguard" component to
the legislative standards test. 203 This legislative safeguards component was similar to the standards test in that it required the legislature to provide safeguards to prevent arbitrary enforcement by administrative agencies. 204 Later, Maryland courts apparently merged
the legislative safeguards test with the legislative standards test. 205
Thus, the inquiry evolved from determining whether the legislative
standards exist, to determining whether legislative safeguards or
standards exist. 206 Under the legislative safeguards or standards test,
if the enabling legislation creates either sufficient standards or sufficient safeguards, it will be upheld. 207 The following two cases
demonstrate how the Court of Appeals of Maryland has applied the
legislative standards or safeguards test.
In County Council for Montgomery County v. Investors Funding
Corp.,208 the court of appeals articulated the legislative standards or
safeguards test and struck down as unconstitutional a portion of a
statute authorizing a county commissioner to issue fines up to
$1000. 209 A group of landlords sought to invalidate an administrative
202. See supra notes 192-93 and accompanying text.
203. See Maryland Theatrical Corp. v. Brennan, 180 Md. 377, 383, 24 A.2d 911, 915
(1942) ("The usual rule with respect to delegations of ... power to administrative [agencies is that they] must be surrounded with such safeguards that
the [agency] cannot [act] arbitrarily."). While the safeguards component began to surface in early cases, it was not until County Council for Montgomery
County v. Investors Funding Corp., 270 Md. 403, 312 A.2d 255 (1973), that the
court of appeals articulated the safeguards component as a distinct alternative
to the standards component. See infra note 206.
204. This test is not to be confused with the procedural safeguards that an agency
may choose to implement on its own initiative. For a discussion of those selfimposed procedural safeguards, see infra notes 356-59 and accompanying text.
205. See infra notes 208-38 and accompanying text.
206. Compare Givner, 207 Md. at 191, 113 A.2d at 902 ("The fact that the promulgation of regulations involves the exercise of discretion and deliberation of a
type that might be described as legislative in character, is not necessarily fatal,
provided there are adequate standards set up . . . . "), with Investors Funding,
270 Md. at 442, 312 A.2d at 246 ("We hold here that because of the complete
lack of any safeguards or standards, the grant of unlimited discretion ... is illegal.").
207. See infra notes 208-38 and accompanying text.
208. 270 Md. 403, 312 A.2d 225 (1973).
209. See id. at 441-42, 312 A.2d at 246. The statute stated, in pertinent part, that
among the powers conveyed was the power to enforce the provisions of the
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regulation, alleging that the enabling legislation that was enacted by
the Montgomery County Council violated the state and federal constitutions. 210 The landlords asserted, inter alia, that the power to fine
which the County Council granted to the Commission on LandlordTenant Affairs was an improper delegation of the power.211
The court of appeals inquired whether the Council's delegation
of the power to fine was constitutional. 212 The court's analysis in Investor's Funding turned on whether adequate legislative safeguards or
standards existed.213 The court first noted that the legislature had
specifically granted the administrative agency the authority to impose fines up to $1000 for a violation of any provision of the statute. 214 The court recognized the general liberality in the trend of
cases that has permitted broad grants of discretion to administrative
officials justified by the need "to facilitate the administration of the
laws as the complexity of the governmental and economic conditions increase [d]. "215
The court explained that a valid delegation of legislative authority to an administrative agency must be accompanied by sufficient legislative safeguards or standards to prevent a violation of
both the separation of powers provision and due process. 216 The
court noted that "[n] 0 meaningful judicial review of the Commission's assessment of such penalties would appear possible in light of
the unrestricted nature of the discretion sought to be vested in the
Act:

210.
211.
212.

213.
214.
215.
216.

through any appropriate means; including but not limited to ... (ii)
the imposition of a civil penalty, not in excess of $1,000, for the violation of any provision of this Chapter, (iii) the imposition of an award
of money damages against a landlord or tenant for the benefit of either as may be provided for in this Chapter.
[d. at 408, 312 A.2d at 228.
See id. at 406, 312 A.2d at 227-33.
See id. at 441,312 A.2d at 246.
See id. at 440-41, 312 A.2d at 245-46. There was no need for the court to inquire whether the power was actually delegated because the legislature specifically delegated the power to fine. See id. The court further indicated that the
power to fine may be constitutionally delegated by the legislature. See id. at
441, 312 A.2d at 246. Therefore, the administrative agency was not legislating,
per se, when it imposed a fine because the legislature had specifically delegated the authority.
See id. at 441-42, 312 A.2d at 246.
See id. at 441, 312 A.2d at 246.
[d. at 442, 312 A.2d at 246.
See id.
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Commission. "217 The Investor's Funding court concluded that the unlimited discretion to impose a fine "up to $1000 without regard to
the nature or gravity of the violation . . . constitute[d] an invalid
delegation of legislative powers and otherwise violate[d] due process of law requirements."218
Recently, in Christ v. Maryland Department of Natural Resources,219
the court of appeals addressed a broad grant of power by the General Assembly to the Department of Natural Resources. 22o The enabling statute at issue granted the Department the power to "adopt
regulations governing the 'operations of any vessels' which are subject to the Act."221 Pursuant to this grant of power, the Department
issued a regulation 222 that prohibited persons under the age of fourteen from operating personal watercraft on Maryland waterways.223
Charles R. Christ sought declaratory relief on behalf of his minor
son, challenging the Department's regulation. 224 Christ challenged
the constitutionality of the power asserted under the delegation
doctrine 225 and whether the Department properly executed its powers as they were conferred by the enabling legislation. 226
The court of appeals rejected Christ's argument that the enabling legislation violated the separation of powers principle. 227 The
court explained that the separation of powers principle does not act
217. [d.
218. [d. at 441, 312 A.2d at 246. The court concluded that the agency's power to
fine had a "total absence of any legislative safeguards." [d. However, the con-

219.
220.

221.
222.

223.

224.
225.
226.

227.

curring opinion aptly recognized that the delegated power at issue was judicial
in nature, rather than legislative. See id. at 459-60, 312 A.2d at 255 (Barnes, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
335 Md. 427, 644 A.2d 34 (1994).
See id. at 431-32, 644 A.2d at 35-36.
[d. at 437, 644 A.2d at 39.
The regulation at issue in Christ was COMAR 08.18.02.05A. See id. at 431 n.l,
644 A.2d at 35 n.1. This regulation provided that" [a] person may not lease,
hire, rent, operate, or give permission to operate a personal watercraft unless
the operator is 14 years old or older." [d. at 433, 644 A.2d at 36.
The statutory grant relied on by the Department of Natural Resources to
adopt the regulation at issue was section 8-704 of the Natural Resources Article which provided that "[ t] he Departmen t may adopt regulations necessary
to carry out the provisions of the subtitle." /d. at 432 n.2, 644 A.2d at 36 n.2.
See id. at 433, 644 A.2d at 36.
See id. at 441-45, 644 A.2d at 40-42.
See id. at 437-40, 644 A.2d at 38-39. For a discussion of the statutory construction analysis employed by the Christ court, see infra notes 276-97 and accompanying text.
See Christ, 335 Md. at 445, 644 A.2d at 42.
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as a complete bar between the branches of government. 228 Specifically, the court noted that the delegation of legislative power to an
executive agency will not violate the separation of power principle
when the regulation is accompanied by "guidelines or safeguards,
sufficient under the circumstances, [and] contained in the pertinent statute or statutes. "229
The court concluded, in this instance, that the enabling legislation did not create a constitutional violation of the separation of
powers principle because adequate legislative safeguards were present. 230 For example, the department could not present any proposed legislation "without first soliciting the advice and opinions of
public officials and representatives of specified types of organizations. "231 Further safeguards included the requirements of "notice,
public comments and public hearings. "232
Additionally, Christ maintained that, "a fundamental policy
making decision," may not be constitutionally delegated by the leg-

228. See id. at 441, 644 A.2d at 40.
229. Id.; see also Judy v. Schaefer, 331 Md. 239, 263, 627 A.2d 1039, 1051 (1993) (determining that the governor's statutory authority to reduce budget appropriations by up to twenty-five percent did not violate separation of powers because
the limitations on the governor's exercise of authority provided sufficient safeguards); Maryland State Police v. Warwick Supply & Equip. Co., 330 Md. 474,
480-81, 624 A.2d 1238, 1241 (1993) (determining that a Board of Public
Works's regulation was consistent with its enabling statute and did not violate
the separation of powers bar); Department of Transp. v. Armacost, 311 Md.
64, 72, 532 A.2d 1056, 1060 (1987) (importing standards from a federal program to validate a state program). The Christ court noted that the requirement of legislative safeguards had been relaxed in prior decisions. See Christ,
335 Md. at 441, 644 A.2d at 40 (citing Pressman v. Barnes, 209 Md. 544, 555,
121 A.2d 816, 822 (1956».
230. See Christ, 335 Md. at 445, 644 A.2d at 42. Quoting Pressman, which acts as an
exception to the standards or safeguards requirement, the court stated the requirement for guidelines is not absolute "where the discretion to be exercised
relates to ... regulations for the protection of public morals, health, safety, or
general welfare, and it is impracticable to fix standards without destroying the
flexibility necessary to enable the administrative officials to carry out the legislative will." Id. at 44142, 644 A.2d at 4041; see also Judy, 331 Md. at 263-64, 627
A.2d at 1051-52. The court, however, did not reach the Pressman analysis noted
above because there were adequate legislative safeguards within the enabling
legislation. See Christ, 335 Md. at 44344, 644 A.2d at 42. For a discussion of the
exception to the legislative standards or safeguards requirement developed in
Pressman, see infra notes 239-62 and accompanying text.
231. Christ, 335 Md. at 443, 644 A.2d at 41.
232. Id. at 444, 644 A.2d at 42.
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islature to the executive branch.233 This type of fundamental policymaking argument has proven convincing to one Supreme Court
Justice 234 and the court of appeals agreed that "the General Assembly cannot constitutionally delegate to another body its 'fundamental decision making authority' in the sense that it cannot delegate a
function which the Constitution expressly and unqualifiedly vests in
the General Assembly itself."235 The court intimated, however, that
fundamental decisionmaking authority is a narrowly limited concept
that includes such acts as the power to impeach, propose constitutional amendments, or to enact statutes. 236 The Christ court opined
that prior decisions of the court of appeals have "repeatedly upheld
the constitutionality of administrative regulations reflecting policy
determinations which have been just as 'fundamental' as the age restriction" set forth in the regulation at issue.237 Thus, the court held
the legislature may authorize administrative agencies with a broad
grant of power to promulgate legislative-type rules such as those at
issue. 238 Christ does not represent the high-water mark for the court
of appeals's liberalization of the nondelegation doctrine. Several decades before Christ, the court of appeals began to carve out an exception to the legislative standards requirement.
d.

The Impracticability Exception to the Legislative Standards or Safeguard
Requirement

In Pressman v. Barnes,239 the court of appeals created the first
true exception to the legislative standards requirement for areas involving police regulations of public safety.240 In Pressman, taxpayers
brought suit against the Director of Traffic, the Mayor, and the City
Council of Baltimore241 alleging that the municipal corporation im233. Id. Christ relied on opinions of the Supreme Court of California. See id. (citing People v. Wright, 639 P.2d 267 (Cal. 1982); KnIgler v. Yocum, 445 P.2d 303,
306 (Cal. 1968».
234. See Industrial Union Dep't v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 687
(1980) (Rehnquist, j., concurring) ("When fundamental policy decisions underlying important legislation about to be enacted are to be made, the buck
stops with Congress and the President insofar as he exercises his constitutional
role in the legislative process.").
235. Christ, 335 Md. at 444, 644 A.2d at 42.
236. See id. at 444-45, 644 A.2d at 42.
237. Id. at 445, 644 A.2d at 42.
238. See id.
239. 209 Md. 544, 121 A.2d 816 (1956).
240. See id. at 555, 121 A.2d at 822.
241. The ordinance at issue gave the Mayor of Baltimore the power to appoint the
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properly delegated the power to regulate the speed limits on certain streets in Baltimore City to the Director. 242 Plaintiffs argued, inter alia, that this delegation of power violated the separation of
powers provision of the Maryland Declaration of Rights. 243
The Pressman court first noted that" [i] t is a fundamental principle that, except when authorized by the Constitution, the Legislature cannot delegate the power to make laws to any other authority. "244 Citing the separation of powers provision, the court
explained that generally, any attempt to abdicate legislative authority is unconstitutiona1. 245 However, the court went on to note that
the separation of powers provision is not violated when a municipal
corporation is vested with legislative powers as to local concerns if
the legislature provided standards for restraint and guidance. 246
Thus, the Pressman court acknowledged that the delegation of

242.
243.

244.
245.
246.

Director of Traffic. See id. at 549, 121 A.2d at 819. The case repeatedly refers
to this delegation of power as a delegation to the Mayor and the City Council.
This Note refers to the two parties collectively as the "municipal corporation."
See id. at 549-50, 121 A.2d at 819.
See id. at 552, 121 A.2d at 820. The municipal corporation delegated the
power to set speed limits to the Director. See id. at 549-52, 121 A.2d at 819-20.
The taxpayers argued, inter alia, that the legislative function of setting speed
limits could not lawfully be delegated by the municipal corporation to the Director. See id. at 549, 121 A.2d at 819-20. The issue turned on whether executive officers, the municipal corporation, could sulHlelegate their legislative authority to a lower level executive, the Director. See id. at 552-54, 121 A.2d at
820-21. However, the standards established in Pressman have been applied to
determine the validity of delegations of power by the legislative branch to administrative agencies as well. See, e.g., County Council for Montgomery County
v. Investor's Funding Corp., 270 Md. 403, 441, 312 A.2d 225, 246 (1973) (rendering a delegation by the legislature to an agency invalid because it lacked
legislative safeguards or standards).
Pressman, 209 Md. at 552, 121 A.2d at 820.
See id.
See id. The court stated that the same constitutional restrictions bind a municipal corporation and the legislature. See id. The court also noted that a municipal corporation may sulHlelegate powers to subordinate officials in order to
carry out ordinances. See id. Although this delegation requires the exercise of
discretion by the subordinate officer, the court explained that this discretion
can fairly be considered part of the police power of the executive branch. See
id. The court cited Tighe v. Osborne, 150 Md. 452, 133 A. 465 (1926), in support of the proposition that this discretion is constitutional if accompanied by
sufficient legislative safeguards to avoid arbitrary and unreasonable exercises
of power. See id.; see also County Comm'rs of Prince George's County v. Northwest Cemetery Co., 160 Md. 653, 656, 154 A. 452, 453 (1931) (voiding a statute
that provides county commissioners with unregulated discretion to allow or
prevent the establishment or maintenance of cemeteries).
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power to Baltimore City, a municipal corporation, to regulate local
traffic was appropriate. 247
The Pressman court then considered whether the power to regulate speed limits could be sub-delegated by the municipal corporation. 248 The court explained that the same type of legislative standards inquiry applies when a municipal corporation sub-delegates
legislative powers to local administrative agencies. 249 The power delegated by the legislature that was sub-delegated by the municipal
corporation related to a matter of public safety.250 The Pressman
court noted that prior decisions had lowered standards in delegation cases in areas such as zoning 251 and public health 252 and reasoned that delegations in the area of public safety should be at least
as flexible as in the area of public health. 253
Mter identifying the general trend towards liberally applying
the nondelegation doctrine to areas of public health, safety,. and
welfare, the Pressman court analyzed whether the municipality's ordinance set forth adequate legislative standards to prevent arbitrary
enforcement by the Director. 254 Normally, a delegation of power
must contain standards to guide the exercise of power. 255 However,
the ordinance that enabled the Director of Traffic to create speed
limits contained no standards. 256 Thus, the Pressman court was
forced to decide that the statute violated the nondelegation doctrine because it lacked adequate legislative standards or require an
exception to the legislative standards requirement.
247. See Pressman, 209 Md. at 554, 121 A.2d at 821.
248. See id. at 552-53, 121 A.2d at 820-21.
249. See id. at 552, 121 A.2d at 820.
250. See id. at 553, 121 A.2d at 821.
251. See Tighe, 150 Md. at 457-58, 133 A. at 467 (1926) (holding that the Mayor and
City Council of Baltimore may delegate to the Zoning Commissioner the ability to determine whether the proposed use of buildings would interfere with
public security, health, or morals).
252. See Givner v. Commissioner of Health, 207 Md. 184, 191, 113 A.2d 899, 902
(1955) (noting that more flexible standards are permitted in public health
than in zoning).
253. See Pressman, 209 Md. at 553, 121 A.2d at 821.
254. See id. at 554-55, 121 A.2d at 821. Typically, these standards must be provided
to prevent arbitrary or unreasonable exercise of power by the administrative
agency beyond the proper scope of the police power. See id.
255. See id.
256. See id. at 550, 121 A.2d at 819 (citing section 2 of the ordinance that empowered the Director and listed such powers). Through its analysis, the Pressman
court indicated that no standards were specifically listed in the ordinance. See
id. at 55~, 121 A.2d at 822.
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The court held that when the discretion to be exercised relates
"to police regulations for the protection of public morals, health,
safety, or general welfare," the regulation could be valid absent any
standards, but only if it was impracticable for the legislature to fix
these standards without destroying the flexibility· necessary to carry
out the legislative intent. 257 Thus, in considering this issue, the Pressman court established an impracticability exception to the general
rule that prevents delegations without standards or safeguards. 258
The Pressman court concluded that the statute at issue did not
contain restrictions to prevent abuse, but fell within the impracticability exception. 259 The court held that under a public safety rationale, the municipal corporation lawfully delegated the power to set
speed limits on the streets of Baltimore to the Director without any
legislative standards or safeguards. 260 The court reasoned that it was
impossible for the legislature to prescribe restrictive guidelines for
traffic regulation because traffic regulation was so complex. 261 Thus,
under the limited exception established in Pressman, a standard-less
delegation may be valid in situations in which it would be impracticable to set standards without destroying the flexibility necessary to
enable administrative officials to carry out the legislature's intent. 262
. These cases illustrate two levels of inquiry that Maryland courts
will engage in when determining a nondelegation issue. Under Investor's Funding, when a court determines the validity of a broad
grant of power to an administrative agency, the court must consider
whether there were adequate standards or safeguards provided by
the legislature. 263 If there are no standards or safeguards for gui257. Id. The court explained:
[g]enerally, a statute or ordinance vesting discretion in admini~trative
officials without fixing any standards for their guidance is an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power. But we also hold, as a qualification of the general rule, that where the discretion to be exercised relates to police regulations for the protection of public morals,
health, safety, or general welfare, and it is impracticable to fix standards without destroying the flexibility necessary to enable the administrative officials to carry out the legislative will, legislation delegating such discretion without such restrictions may be valid.
Id. (citations omitted).
258. See id.
259. See id. at 554-55, 121 A.2d at 821-22.
260. See id. at 554, 121 A.2d at 821.
261. See id. at 553, 555, 121 A.2d at 821-22.
262. See id. at 555, 121 A.2d at 822.
263. See supra text accompanying note 213.
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dance, a regulation must be held invalid unless it falls within the
Pressman exception-when standards would be impracticable to
set. 264 Under Christ, if either of these tests are met, the administrative agency may promulgate regulations that are consistent with the
letter and spirit of the enabling statute. 265 Determining what is
within the letter and spirit of an enabling statute requires a court to
perform a statutory construction analysis. 266 Section IV of this Note
highlights a few canons of statutory construction that courts often
utilize in the administrative law context in deciphering the legislature's intent.
IV.

MARYLAND'S RULES OF STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION IN
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

As noted, broad statutory delegations of administrative regulatory authority are often challenged on constitutional grounds. 267
Claimants often argue that the non delegation doctrine is violated
when a legislative body assigns its "lawmaking function" to an administrative agency.268 However, broad delegations of power are
rarely voided under the nondelegation doctrine. 269 Maryland courts
have recognized that the legislature is often unable to anticipate
every specific grant of power to promulgate each necessary regulation as "it is manifestly impracticable for the legislature to set specific guidelines to govern the day-to-day exercise of rulemaking
power."270
More frequently, courts focus on whether the power exercised
by the agency was impermissibly expanded beyond the intent of the
legislature. 271 Therefore, a challenge to an agency's exercise of
264.
265.
266.
267.

268.

269.
270.
271.

See supra note 257 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 284-97 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 276-97 and accompanying text.
See Falik v. Prince George's Hosp. & Med. Ctr., 322 Md. 409, 415-18, 588 A.2d
324, 327-28 (1991) (challenging the Workmen's Compensation Commission's
discretion to disapprove fees for medical services rendered in excess of Commission guidelines); Governor of Maryland v. Exxon Corp., 279 Md. 410, 44041, 370 A.2d 1102, 1119 (1979), afi'd, 437 U.S. 117 (1978) (challenging the
constitutionality of a statute proscribing petroleum producers or refiners from
selling petroleum products at retail outlets).
See, e.g., Pressman v. Barnes, 209 Md. 544, 121 A.2d 816 (1956).
For a discussion of the liberalization of the nondelegation doctrine by Maryland courts, see supra notes 195-262 and accompanying text.
Sullivan v. Board of License Comm'rs, 293 Md. 113, 123, 442 A.2d 558, 563
(1982) .
See Pressman, 209 Md. at 557, 121 A.2d at 823; see also Falik, 322 Md. at 417,588
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power often requires the reviewing court to apply canons of statutory construction to the enabling legislation to determine whether
the legislature has actually conveyed the specific power sought to be
exercised by the agency.272 The primary purpose of this statutory
construction analysis is to carry out the legislature's intent. 273 If the
legislature delegates enumerated powers to an agency, and the
agency's action extends beyond the reach of the specifically delegated power, then that action may be invalidated by a court. 274 However, Maryland courts extend substantial deference to legislative decisions to delegate a broad grant of power to administrative
agencies. 275
Christ v. Maryland Department of Natural Resources-76 is illustrative
of the general deference courts will accord an agency attempting to
carry out the intent of the legislature. 277 In addition to the constitutional challenge previously discussed,278 the court of appeals held
that a broad grant of power under an enabling statute permitted
the Department of Natural Resources to promulgate a regulation
prohibiting children under the age of fourteen from operating personal watercraft. 279 Christ argued that the statute 280 did not provide
the administrative agency with the power to promulgate a regulation 281 that would prevent persons under a certain age from operatA.2d at 328.
272. For a discussion of the application of a statutory construction analysis to determine what was included under a broad legislative grant of authority, see infra notes 336-55 and accompanying text.
273. See Holy Cross Hosp. v. Health Servs. Cost Review Comm'n, 283 Md. 677, 684,
393 A.2d 181, 184 (1978) (citing Mazor v. State Dep't of Correction, 279 Md.
355, 369 A.2d 82 (1977».
274. See Brzowski v. Maryland Home Improvement Comm'n, 114 Md. App. 615,
626,691 A.2d 699, 704 (1997).
275. See SuUivan, 293 Md. at 122, 442 A.2d at 563 (observing that the court of appeals has "upheld broad delegations of legislative power to administrative
agencies" in a long line of cases).
276. 335 Md. 427, 644 A.2d 34 (1994).
277. See id. at 431, 644 A.2d at 35 (resolving a declaratory judgment action brought
to challenge a Department of Natural Resources regulation prohibiting the
operation of personal watercraft by a person under the age of 14).
278. For a discussion of the constitutional challenge considered in Christ, see supra
notes 219-38 and accompanying text.
279. See Christ, 335 Md. at 443, 644 A.2d at 41.
280. See MD. CODE ANN., NAT. REs. I. § 8-704 (Supp. 1997). The statute notes that,
" [t] he Department may adopt regulations necessary to carry out the provisions of this subtitle." Id.
281. The Department promulgated a regulation in the Code of Maryland Regula-
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ing watercraft. 282 The court of appeals disagreed. 283
The Christ court noted that its prior decisions generally upheld
administrative agency rules or regulations "as long as they did not
contradict the language or purpose of the statute."284 Christ asserted
that the Department contradicted the purpose of the enabling statute by "prohibit[ing] the use of vessels by an entire class of citizens
of the State. "285 The court suggested that Christ's reading of the
purpose of the statute was unduly narrow. 286 The court opined that
the legislature's grant of power to the agency was purposefully
broad.287 The court concluded, "[i]n any particular area of legislative concern, whether there should be a broad general delegation
of regulatory authority to administrators, or a more specific delegation, is a choice for the General Assembly."288
The thrust of the plaintiff'S argument was that the Department's mission, as enunciated in the Department's enabling statute,
was to promote boat safety and education. 289 As such, completely
prohibiting youngsters from operating boats was inconsistent with
this mission. 290 The plaintiff reasoned that this inconsistency existed
because the State Boat Act evinced an "overall spirit" to educate
young boaters as opposed to prohibit them from operating certain
vessels. 291
The court stated that the General Assembly need not specifically delegate the power to prevent a class of persons from operating watercraft. 292 The court noted that "[ t] he broad authority to
promulgate 'regulations governing the ... operations of any vessels'

282.
283.
284.
285.
286.
287.
288.
289.

290.
291.
292.

tions, which provided: "A person may not lease, hire, rent, operate, or give
permission to operate a personal watercraft unless: (1) the operator is 14 years
old or older .... " COMAR 08.18.02.05A.
See Christ, 335 Md. at 433-34, 644 A.2d at 36-37.
See id. at 437, 644 A.2d at 39.
Id. at 438, 644 A.2d at 39.
Id. at 439, 644 A.2d at 39.
See id.
See id.
Id.
See id. at 437, 644 A.2d at 38. The State Boat Act directs the Department to
" [p 1romote the safety of life and property through an educational program
directed to boat· owners, boat operators, and others concerning the inherent
hazards of vessels." MD. CODE ANN .. NAT. REs. I § 8-703(a)(2) (1990 & Supp.
1993) .
See Christ, 335 Md. at 437, 644 A.2d at 38.
See id.
See id.
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plainly encompasses a regulation prohibiting the operation of certain motor vessels by persons under 14. "293 The court's conclusion
was supported by cases in which it previously held that it would be
impracticable for the legislature to set specific guidelines to govern
the day-to-day exercise of rulemaking power. 294
The court agreed that the legislative intent behind the enabling statute was to promote boating safety.295 However, the court
held that the agency's regulation restricting the age of boat operators was "a reasonable regulation to promote the statutory purpose
of boating safety."296 Thus, the Christ court held that the regulation
at issue was promulgated pursuant to a broad grant of power, and
therefore could include age restrictions because it would be impracticable for the legislature to have to deal with the complex issues of
boating safe ty. 297
While Christ illustrates the deference accorded by the courts to
administrative agencies, an agency's power in not unlimited. For example, in Pressman, after resolving the constitutional issue,298 the
court conducted a thorough statutory construction analysis299 of an
enabling statute that conferred power to the City of Baltimore. The
Pressman court examined whether an enabling statute passed by the
293. Id.
294. See id.; see also Falik v. Prince George's Hosp., 322 Md. 40.9, 417, 588 A.2d 324,
328 (1991); Sullivan v. Board of License Comm'rs, 293 Md. 113, 122-23, 442
A.2d 558, 563 (1982); Governor of Maryland v. Exxon Corp., 279 Md. 410, 441,
370. A.2d 110.2, 1119 (1977), aff'd, 437 U.S. 117 (1978).
295. See Christ, 335 Md. at 443, 644 A.2d at 41.
296. Id.
297. See id. at 43941, 644 A.2d 3940..
298. For a discussion of the Pressman court's constitutional inquiry, see supra text
accompanying notes 239-62.
299. See Pressman v. Barnes, 20.9 Md. 544, 558-59, 121 A.2d 816, 823-24 (1956). The
Pressman court noted that in determining the legislative intent of an enactment, a court should consider the language used by the legislature in its natural and ordinary sense. See id. at 558, 121 A.2d at 823. If no ambiguity exists,
applying the canons of statutory construction is unnecessary. See id. If the
words used are ambiguous on their face, their meanings may be expanded or
contracted to harmonize the language of the statute with the legislature's intent if that intent can be ascertained by the construction. See id. The meaning
of the words depends on the history of the statute and its objectives. See id. at
558-59, 121 A.2d at 823; see also United States v. Hartwell, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.)
385, 395-96 (1867) (noting that penal statutes are to be construed strictly and
intent is to be gathered from the words used in context); Norfolk & Portsmouth Traction Co. v. Ellington's Admiral, 61 S.E. 779, 782 (Va. 190.8) (relying
on context and "remedy in view" in interpreting an ambiguous statute).
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Maryland General Assembly that allowed the City of Baltimore to
regulate any road within the city's limits, except for extensions of
state roads, included the power to regulate roads within the city
marked as state roads. 30o Baltimore's City Council delegated the
power to the Director of Traffic. 301 In turn, the Director of Traffic
posted speed limits on roads within the city's boundaries. 302 Mter
the Pressman court determined that the delegation of power to the
City Council did not violate the separation of powers doctrine,303 it
addressed whether the Director of Traffic's administrative regulation
was within the domain of powers conferred by the General
Assembly.304
The City argued that the ordinance passed by the Director did
not affect any streets that were "designated or maintained as a part
of the State or Federal highway system or an extension thereof."305
The City reasoned that the ordinance was lawful because the City
did not exceed the lawmaking power given to it by the General Assembly.306 Although the taxpayers conceded that the state did not
maintain the roads at issue, they argued that many of the city
streets were "part of the State highway system or at least extensions
of that system. "307 Therefore, the taxpayers asserted that the exercise
of power by the city over these streets exceeded the power given to
it by the state legislature. 308
The court's interpretation of the statute necessarily focused on
whether the streets at issue were considered "extensions" of state
highways.309 The court first noted that the cardinal rule of statutory
300. See Pressman, 209 Md. at 557, 121 A.2d at 823. The statute stated in relevant
part:
[n]otwithstanding any other provision of this Article, the appropriate
authorities of any incorporated city . . . are authorized . . . to regulate the speed of vehicles on any road ... which is within their respective corporate limits and which has not been designated or maintained as a part of the State or Federal highway system or an
extension thereof.
Id.
301. See id. at 549, 121 A.2d at 819.
302. See id.
303. See id. at 554, 121 A.2d at 821.
304. See id. at 557-61, 121 A.2d at 823-24.
305. Id. at 557, 121 A.2d at 823.
306. See id.
307. Id. at 557-58, 121 A.2d at 823.
308. See id.
309. See id. at 559, 121 A.2d at 824.
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construction is that statutes should always be construed to carry out
the legislature's intent. 31O The court further stated that in cases of
ambiguity, the proper course of construction is to adopt the meaning that best harmonizes with the context of the statute and promotes the policies and objectives of the legislature. 311
The Pressman court considered the meaning of "extension" and
noted that it is a flexible term that lends "itself to a variety of meanings."312 The court reasoned that because the meaning of the word
extension was flexible, it had to be ascertained within the context of
the particular factual situation. 313 The Pressman court analyzed "extension" in the context of city streets that were continuations of the
State highway system. 314 The court highlighted the fact that the
streets at issue, despite being within city limits, were clearly marked
with state road signs "erected by the State Roads Commission."315 In
light of the broad meaning of the word extension, in conjunction
with the state road signs, the court held that the regulation of these
roads by the state was beyond the power conferred to it by the statute. 316 Therefore, the Director of Traffic was enjoined from posting
speed limits on these roads because the city never had the power to
grant the Director the authority to do so.317
The Pressman court's analysis illustrates a commonly asserted alternative ground on which to challenge a delegation of power to an
agency when a nondelegation doctrine argument fails.318 While Maryland cases indicate that the courts are willing to accord substantial
deference to agency rulemaking pursuant to broad statutory grants
of power, it would be inaccurate to conclude that litigants challenging an agency's power are left without canons in their arsenal. Subsection A elaborates on the primary canons of construction that apply to the administrative law context.

A.

Three Primary Methods of Determining Legislative Intent
Ordinarily, an administrative remedy must be invoked before

310.
311.
312.
313.
314.
315.
316.
317.
318.

See
See
Id.
See
See
Id.
See
See
See

id. at 558, 121 A.2d at 823.
id. at 558-59,121 A.2d at 823.
at 559, 121 A.2d at 824.
id.
id.
at 559-60, 121 A.2d at 824.
id. at 560, 121 A.2d at 824.
id.
id.
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resorting to an independent judicial remedy.319 Mter a party exhausts its administrative remedies, it may seek judicial relief on the
grounds that the agency's construction of the enabling statute was
erroneous. When construing a statute in the administrative law context, courts will apply the traditional canons of statutory construction. 32o In addition to traditional canons of statutory construction,
there are several unique canons of construction that apply to administrative law decisions.321
Courts often examine three factors when trying to determine
the legislature's intent with respect to determining the scope of
power granted to an agency under an enabling act. The primary
factor courts look to is the construction that the administrative
agency placed on the statute shortly after it was passed. 322 This construction often has a "strong, persuasive influence" on a court's
overall interpretation. 323 Additionally, courts will look to the nature
of the process that led to the agency's interpretation. The second
factor courts consider is the Attorney General's interpretation of the
statute. 324 Courts will presume that the legislature is aware of an At319. See Maryland-Nat'l Capital Park & Planning Comm'n, v. Crawford, 307 Md. 1,
25, 511 A.2d 1079, 1091 (1986) (noting that a plaintiff must invoke and exhaust his administrative remedies before maintaining an action in court).
320. See 3 NORMAN J. SINGER, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 65.02. at 312
(5th ed. 1992) ("The usual rules of statutory construction are controlling for
the purpose of determining what administrative powers, rights, privileges and
immunities are granted.").
321. See Holy Cross Hosp. v. Health Servs. Cost Review Comm'n, 283 Md. 677, 68586, 393 A.2d 181, 185 (1978).
322. See Demory Bros. v. Board of Pub. Works, 20 Md. 467, 473, 316 A.2d 529, 532
(1974).
323. Holy Cross, 283 Md. at 685, 393 A.2d at 185; see also Farber's, Inc., v. Comptroller of the Treasury, 266 Md. 44, 50-51, 291 A.2d 658, 661-62 (1972) (explaining
that an administrative construction of a statute applied shortly after the enactment of the statute should not be disregarded "except for the strongest and
most cogent reasons," while rules and regulations adopted by administrative
agencies must be reasonable and consistent with the letter and policy of the
statute under which the agency acts); F. & M. Schaefer Brewing Co. v. Comptroller of the Treasury, 255 Md. 211, 218, 257 A.2d 416, 419 (1969) (illustrating
an argument made by the Comptroller that his construction of the statute
should be strongly persuasive and influential on the judicial construction of
the statute). On the federal level, broad judicial deference is given to an
agency's construction of a statute. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 851 (1984) (explaining that judicial deference must be accorded to an agency's construction of a statute).
324. See Demory Bros., 20 Md. at 473, 316 A.2d at 532.
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torney General's interpretation. 325 The final factor courts look to is
the legislative history of the statute, particularly the presence or absence of legislative amendments which would support or exempt an
agency's interpretation. 326

1.

The Agency's Construction of the Statute

Statutory construction is a judicial function.327 However, courts
will consider an agency's interpretation of an enabling statute when
deciphering the legislature's intent.328 If the statutory language in
question is ambiguous, a long-standing administrative interpretation
may be given weight. 329 Indeed, Maryland courts have gone so far as
to hold that an agency's interpretation "should not be disregarded
except for the strongest and most urgent reason."330
In particular, a long-standing administrative interpretation that
was established immediately or shortly after the enabling act passed
and that continued uniformly thereafter gives rise to a strong presumption that the interpretation is correct. 331 Courts will construe
an absence of legislative amendments as indicative of a continuous
325. See id.
326. See id.
327. See Mitchell v. Register of Wills, 227 Md. 305, 311, 176 A.2d 763, 766 (1962)
(holding that the Maryland General Assembly acquiesced in an administrative
agency's construction of a statue where the General Assembly had ample time
to amend it and did nothing).
328. See Commission on Human Relations v. Baltimore County, 46 Md. App. 45, 58,
415 A.2d 856, 863 (1980).
329. See Macke Co. v. State Dep't of Assessments & Taxation, 264 Md. 121, 134, 285
A.2d 593, 599-600 (1972) (giving great weight to twenty-five year administrative
interpretation of a statute); Department of Motor Vehicles v. Greyhound
Corp., 247 Md. 662, 669, 234 A.2d 255, 258 (1967) (noting that an administrative interpretation is accorded "great weight by the courts").
330. Holy Cross Hosp. v. Health Servs. Cost Review Comm'n, 283 Md. 677, 685, 393
A.2d 181, 185 (1978).
331. See Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public Servo Comm'n, 305 Md. 145, 161, 501
A.2d 1307, 1315 (1986) (noting that an agency charged with the administration of a statute is entitled to great deference in its interpretation, especially
when the interpretation has been consistently applied for a long period of
time); National Asphalt Pavement Assoc. v. Prince George's County, 292 Md.
75, 80, 437 A.2d 651, 653 (1981) (noting that a consistent construction of a
statute by an administrative agency responsible for administering the statute is
entitled to considerable weight); Holy Cross, 283 Md. at 685-86, 393 A.2d at
185; see also Board of Educ. v. Lendo, 295 Md. 55, 63, 453 A.2d 1185, 1189
(1982) (noting that an agency's interpretation of a statute more than a half of
a century after its enactment is not long-standing).
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acquiescence to the administrative construction. 332 Legislative acquiescence to the administrative construction of the statute will be
deemed to have occurred when the legislature had "ample time to
amend it," but remained silent. 333 Thus, Maryland courts, in effect,
use the agency's construction to infer legislative intent.
When the statutory language is unambiguous, an administrative
interpretation that directly conflicts with its plain meaning will not
be given weight, even if the interpretation was long-standing. 334
Moreover, little or no weight will be given to an administrative interpretation of a statute if an agency has inconsistently interpreted
the statute or has failed to enforce the statute in accordance with
the agency's own interpretation. 335 An illustrative example of an
agency's inconsistent interpretation of its enabling statute and its effect on a court's statutory construction analysis is Holy Cross Hospital
v. Health Services Cost Review Commission. 336
In Holy Cross, the court of appeals was called on to interpret a
broad statutory grant of power by the Maryland General Assembly
to the Maryland Health Services Cost Review Commission. 337 The
broad enabling legislation granted the Commission the power to

332. See Holy Cross, 283 Md. at 685, 393 A.2d at 181.
333. Id. When the administrative agency responsible for administering the statute
has made its interpretation known to the legislature in agency reports, it is entitled to great weight. See Falik v. Prince George's Hosp. & Med. Ctr., 322 Md.
409, 416, 588 A.2d 324, 327 (1991) (noting that considerable weight should be
given to an administrative construction of a statute when the legislature was
aware of the interpretation in the agency's reports).
334. See Falik, 322 Md. at 416, 588 A.2d at 327 (" [W]hen the statutory language is
unambiguous, administrative constructions, no matter how well entrenched,
are not given weight."); Lendo, 295 Md. at 63, 453 A.2d at 1189 (noting that
"[n]o custom, however venerable, can nullify the plain meaning and purpose
of a statute"); Holy Cross, 283 Md. at 685, 393 A.2d at 185; City of Hagerstown
v. Long Meadow Shopping Ctr., 264 Md. 481, 493, 287 A.2d 242, 248 (1972)
(noting that adherence to the rule of deference to long-standing administrative interpretation is conditional upon the enabling statute being ambiguous);
Shapiro v. City of Baltimore, 230 Md. 199, 216, 186 A.2d 605, 615 (1962) (noting that no custom, no matter how long it has been followed by administrative
officials, can nullify the plain meaning and purpose of the statute).
335. See Comptroller of the Treasury v.John C. Louis Co., 285 Md. 527, 545, 404
A.2d 1045, 1056 (1979); 2B SINGER, supra note 320, § 49.05, at 18 ("[W]eight
given to an agency interpretation depends on many factors including . . . its
consistency with earlier and later agency pronouncements.").
336. 283 Md. 677, 393 A.2d 181 (1978).
337. See id. at 679, 393 A.2d at 182.
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regulate hospital charges. 338 The central issue was whether the Commission's act of setting physicians' fees went beyond the scope of
power granted to the Commission by its enabling legislation. 339
Under the enabling act, the Commission was granted quasi-legislative powers. 340 Specifically, the enabling act at issue granted the
Commission the power to regulate the "total costs of the hospital"
and to "review and approve the reasonableness of rates established
or requested by any hospital. "341 The Commission established physicians' fees in the specialties of cardiology, pathology, and
radiology.342
The Commission was of the opinion that this act fell within its
authority to regulate the total costs of the hospital. 343 Holy Cross
Hospital challenged the regulation, arguing that the contested physicians' fees were not part of the total costs of the hospital; therefore, the Commission exceeded its authority under the enabling
act. 344 In an attempt to discern whether the total costs of the hospital included the contested physicians' fees 345 the Holy Cross court ap338. See id. at 682-83, 393 A.2d at 184.
339. See id. at 679, 393 A.2d at 182. The statute in Holy Cross stated that the Commission had the power to " [e]xercise, subject to the limitations and restrictions herein imposed, all other powers which are reasonably necessary or essential to carry out the expressed objects and purposes of this subtitle." Id. at
680 n.l, 393 A.2d at 182 n.l (citing MD. ANN. CODE art. 43, § 568M(3) (1971 &
Supp. 1978».
340. The Commission's powers were quasi-legislative in nature because the Commission could establish hospital rates in accordance with the enabling act. See
id. at 682-83, 393 A.2d at 184. Under the enabling act, =the hospital's aggregate rates [had to be] reasonably related to the hospital's aggregate costs.'" Id.
at 682, 393 A.2d at 184 (quoting MD. ANN. CODE art. 43, § 568U(a) (1971 &
Supp. 1978».
341. Id. at 682-83, 393 A.2d at 184.
342. See id. at 679, 393 A.2d at 182. The Commission believed that it had the authority to regulate the rates charged in cardiology, pathology, and radiology
because those specialties involved services of the hospital and the Commission
had the authority to concern itself with all costs associated with the services
rendered to patients in the hospital. See id. at 680, 393 A.2d at 182-83.
343. See id.
344. See id. at 681, 393 A.2d at 183.
345. See id. at 684-89, 393 A.2d at 184-87. The statute specified:
[T] he Commission shall have the power to initiate such reviews or investigations as may be necessary to assure all purchasers of health
care hospital services that the total costs of the hospital are reasonably related to the total services offered by the hospital, [and] that the
hospital's aggregate rates are reasonably related to the hospital'S aggregate costs . . . . In order to properly discharge these obligations,
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plied several general principles of statutory construction. 346
The Court determined that several possible meanings of the
term existed. 347 As such, the statutory language was deemed ambiguOUS,348 a finding which permitted the court to place weight on the
agency's interpretation. 349 However, no long-standing administrative
interpretation of the enabling act existed because the Commission
had reversed its position on its authority to establish physicians'
fees. 35o
When the enabling act was first passed, the Commission had interpreted the setting of physicians' fees to be outside its scope of

346.

347.

348.
349.
350.

the Commission shall have full power to review and approve the reasonableness of rates established or requested by any hospital subject
to the provisions of this subtitle.
[d. at 682-83, 393 A.2d at 184 (quoting MD. ANN. CODE art. 43, § 568U (1971 &
Supp. 1978».
The court stated a litany of traditional statutory construction principles:
As we have so often said, the cardinal rule of construction of a statute is to ascertain and carry out the real intention of the Legislature.
The primary source from which we glean this intention is the language of the statute itself. And in construing a statute we accord the
words their ordinary and natural signification. If reasonably possible,
a statute is to be read so that no word, phrase, clause, or sentence is
rendered surplusage or meaningless. Similarly, wherever possible an
interpretation should be given to statutory language which will not
lead to absurd consequences. Moreover, if the statute is part of the
general statutory scheme or system, the sections must be read together to ascertain the true intention of the Legislature.
[d. at 684, 393 A.2d at 184-85 (citations omitted).
However, the court recognized that "construing a statute liberally and adding to it, by judicial fiat, a provision which the Legislature did not see fit to
include are not one and the same thing." [d. at 685, 393 A.2d at 185 (quoting
Harden v. Maryland Transit Auth., 277 Md. 399, 406, 354 A.2d 817, 821
(1976». The court stated that the legislature'S intent was to provide for administrative review of hospital charges to insure that the total costs of the hospital were reasonably related to the total services offered by the hospital. See
id. at 687, 393 A.2d at 186.
The court concluded that "total costs of the hospital means the Hospital's expenditures or outlays of money in connection with the operation of the Hospital." [d. at 689, 393 A.2d at 187 (internal quotation marks omitted). The
court noted that when the statute was enacted, the term "total costs of the
hospital" may have been considered a "term of art in the health care field
having a well understood meaning different from its common signification
which would include the fees of the physicians here." [d.
See id. at 687-89, 393 A.2d at 186-87.
See id. at 685, 393 A.2d at 185.
See id. at 685-86, 393 A.2d at 185.
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authority under the act. 351 Several years later, the Commission
changed its position and asserted that it had the authority to set
physicians' fees.352 Thus, the Commission's inconsistent interpretation was a factor the court considered in assessing what weight to
give the Commission's interpretation. 353
Applying this principle of statutory construction, the Holy Cross
court intimated that the Commission's current interpretation of the
enabling act would not have persuasive influence on the court's
construction of the statute. 354 The Holy Cross court, however, was unable to determine whether the fees charged by the physicians were
part of the total costs of the hospital due to lack of evidence· in the
trial court record and remanded the case. 355
a.

The Procedures Employed by the Agency in Reaching Its Interpretation

Although the procedures employed by an agency in arriving at
its interpretation do not rise to the level of more traditional canons
of statutory construction, they are relevant in assessing the weight
accorded the agency's interpretation. 356 For example, when the
agency's interpretation of a statute is the result of (1) the agency
"focus[ing] its attention on the statutory provisions in question, (2)
thoroughly address[ing] the relevant issues, and (3) reach[ing] its
interpretation through a sound reasoning process," then that interpretation is given deference by the courts. 357 However, if the
agency's interpretation does not arise out of contested adversarial
proceedings or formal rule procedure, the court is not likely to find
351.
352.
353.
354.

See
See
See
See

id.
id.
id.
id. The court explained:

[T]he view taken of a statute by administrative officials soon after its
passage is strong, persuasive influence in determining the judicial
construction and should not be disregarded except for the strongest
and most urgent reasons .... Even if sufficient time had passed since
enactment of the statute here under consideration for administrative
interpretation of it to be regarded as long-standing, no such interpretation exists here because the Commission has reversed its position.
Id. (citations omitted).
355. See id. at 689-90, 393 A.2d at 187.
356. See Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public Servo Comm'n, 305 Md. 145, 162, 501
A.2d 1307, 1315 (1986) (holding that an administrative agency's interpretation
of its enabling statute was to be given weight because it was the product of
contested proceedings).
357. Id. at 161-62, 501 A.2d at 1315.
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it persuasive. 358 Additionally, it can be asserted that if the legislature
delegates excessive lawmaking powers, no amount of administrative
procedure that an agency institutes will cure a nondelegation doctrine violation. 359
2.

Attorney General Opinions

As the state's chief counsel,360 the Attorney General of Maryland has a tremendous impact on administrative law. It is the constitutional duty of the attorney general to represent the state when it
is brought before an administrative agency361 and to represent the
state administrative agencies before the courts. 362 Another duty of
the attorney general is to interpret the meaning of an administrative agency's enabling statute and reduce it to a written advisory
opinion for all interested parties. 363 In turn, agencies often rely on
these attorney general opinions in executing the power granted to
them under the enabling statute. 364
The attorney general advisory opinions are often relied on by
courts when interpreting ambiguous language in an administrative
agency's enabling statute. 365 As with other extraneous authority,
courts will only look to attorney general advisory opinions when
358. See id; Comptroller v. John C. Louis Co., 285 Md. 527, 544, 404 A.2d 1045,
1056 (1979).
359. Cf supra note 146 and accompanying text.
360. See MD. CODE ANN., STATE GoV'T § 6-106(b) (1998); State ex reL Attorney Gen.
v. Burning Tree Club, Inc., 301 Md. 9, 34, 481 A.2d 785, 797 (1984).
361. See MD. CODE ANN., CONST. art. 5, § 3(a)(1) (1981).
362. See id. § 3(a)(2).
363. Notably, this power is one for attorneys general, but not for the courts. Compare Maryland-Nat'l Capital Park & Planning Comm'n v. Randall, 209 Md. 18,
27, 120 A.2d 195, 199 (1956) (refusing to issue an advisory opinion "to the
Legislature or anyone else"), and Hatt v. Anderson, 297 Md. 42, 46, 464 A.2d
1076,1078 (1983), with MD. CODE ANN., CONST. art. 5, § 3(a)(4) (1981) (requiring the attorney general to "[gl ive his opinion in writing whenever required
by the General Assembly or either branch thereof, the Governor, the Comptroller, the Treasury or any State's Attorney on any legal matter or subject").
364. See Mitchell v. Register of Wills, 227 Md. 305, 310, 176 A.2d 763, 766 (1962)
(noting that attorney general opinions are "entitled to careful consideration
and serve as important guides to those charged with the administration of the
law"); see also MD. CODE ANN., STATE GoV'T § 10-107(b) (1995) ("Unless a proposed regulation is submitted to the Attorney General . . . for approval as to
legality, the regulation: (1) may not be adopted under any statutory authority;
and (2) if adopted, is not effective.").
365. See Bouze v. Hutzler, 180 Md. 682, 687, 26 A.2d 767, 769 (1942).
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statutory language is ambiguous. 366 Even when the enabling statute
is ambiguous, attorney general advisory opinions do not bind
courts. 367 Courts that do rely on these advisory opinions do so
under the rule of contemporaneous construction. 368
The rule of contemporaneous construction is a rule of statutory
construction that enables a court to draw inferences of legislative intent. 369 When an attorney general has issued an advisory opinion on
a particular matter and the legislature has failed to react to this
opinion through a legislative amendment, a court may consider this
acquiescence to the opinion. 370 According to the court of appeals:
[W] hen the meaning of the legislative language is not entirely clear, such legal interpretation and administrative construction should be given great consideration in determining the legislative intent. The Legislature knew, or must be
presumed to know, of this interpretation and administrative
construction at the time of [a law's passage] and must be
held to have employed the language it did with that interpretation in viewY)
Even if legislative acquiescence can be inferred through the
rule of contemporaneous construction, the courts are the final arbiter of the law and are always free to disagree with an attorney general's opinion. 372 This is particularly true when an attorney general
issues inconsistent opinions on the same matter or when the court
deems the interpretation incorrect. 373 Even when an attorney general opinion has been consistently applied and the legislature has
366. See Schmidt v. Beneficial Finance Co., 285 Md. 148, 158, 400 A.2d 1124, 1129
(1979); Falcone v. Palmer Ford, 242 Md. 487,494, 219 A.2d 808, 810-11 (1966);
Bouze, 180 Md. at 687, 26 A.2d at 769.
367. See Schmidt, 285 Md. at 158, 400 A.2d at 1129; Falcone, 242 Md. at 494, 219 A.2d
at 810-11; Bouze, 180 Md. at 687, 26 A.2d at 769.
368. See Bouze, 180 Md. at 687, 26 A.2d at 769.
369. See Read Drug & Chern. Co. v. Claypoole, 165 Md. 250, 257, 166 A. 742, 745
(1933).
370. See State v. Crescent Cities Jaycees Found., Inc., 330 Md. 460, 470, 624 A.2d
955,960 (1993); Crest Inv. Trust, Inc. v. Cohen, 245 Md. 639, 64748, 227 A.2d
8, 13 (1967).
371. Read Drug & Chem. Co., 165 Md. at 161, 501 A. at 745.
372. See Crescent Cities, 330 Md. at 470, 624 A.2d at 960; Schmidt, 285 Md. at 158, 400
A.2d at 1129; Falcone, 242 Md. at 493-94, 219 A.2d at 810; Read Drug & Chern.
Co., 165 Md. at 257, 166 A. at 745.
373. See Bouze, 180 Md. at 687, 26 A.2d at 769 (noting inconsistent rulings between
successive attorneys general in finding a lack of persuasiveness).
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amended a statute, but failed to address the attorney general's opinion, the rule of contemporaneous construction can fail. 374
For example, in response to the contention that the rule of
contemporaneous construction "should not be disregarded except
on the most imperative ground," the court of appeals once proclaimed: "The imperative ground here is that we do not agree with
the conclusion reached by the Attorney General. "375 Thus, while attorney general advisory opinions have some significance in administrative law, courts are always free to disagree.

3.

Legislative History of the Statute and the Agency

The legislative history of the statute, as well as the history of
the agency itself, will be considered in deciphering legislative intent.
Gutwein v. Easton Publishing CO.,376 provides an illustrative example of
how courts deal with legislative history in the administrative law
context. In Gutwein, the court of appeals held that an administrative
agency could not award compensatory damages without explicit authority in the agency's enabling statute. 377
In Gutwein, Easton Publishing allegedly discharged Paul D.
Gutwein in violation of an anti-discrimination law. 378 The legislature
originally charged the Human Relations Commission with the duty
to investigate any allegations of discrimination "and to take such affirmative action as will effectuate the purposes of the particular subtitle."379 Upon investigating Gutwein's discharge, the Commission
See, e.g., Schmidt, 285 Md. at 158, 400 A.2d at 1129.
[d.
272 Md. 563, 325 A.2d 740 (1974).
See id. at 576-77, 325 A.2d at 747.
See id. at 565, 325 A.2d at 741. The statute violated by Easton provided:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer: (a) To
fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation,
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, creed, sex, age or national origin.
Id. at 565-66, 325 A.2d at 741.
379. [d. at 565, 325 A.2d at 741. The statute provides in pertinent part:
[T]he Commission shall hold a public hearing ... [and] "[i]f upon
all the evidence, the Commission finds that the respondent has engaged in any discriminatory act within the scope of any of these subtitles, it shall so state its findings. The Commission thereupon shall issue and cause to be served upon the respondent an order requiring
the respondent to cease and desist from the discriminatory acts and
to take such affirmative action as will effectuate the purposes of the
particular subtitle."

374.
375.
376.
377.
378.
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found that Easton Publishing discriminated against Gutwein, a white
male, because his fiancee was black. 380 The Commission awarded
Gutwein six weeks lost pay and moving expenses as compensatory
damages.38I
Following the award of compensatory damages to Gutwein, Easton Publishing appealed to the Circuit Court for Talbot County.382
The circuit court reversed the Commission's award of compensatory
damages after concluding that Gutwein failed to prove any
redressable injury.383 The Commission and Gutwein appealed the
circuit court's decision. 384 The court of appeals determined that the
Commission's finding that a redressable injury had occurred
"should have been accepted by the circuit court."385
However, before allowing the Commission's award to stand, the
court of appeals addressed whether the Commission even had the
power to award compensatory damages. 386 The enabling statute did
not explicitly authorize the Commission to award compensatory
damages. 387 Gutwein and the Commission asserted that the agency's
authority to order affirmative action was analogous to state and federal civil rights laws, which have been "interpreted 'expansively' to
permit the payment of compensatory damages to victims of discrimination. "388 Mter examining the assertedly analogous federal and
state civil rights cases, the court of appeals concluded that no court
has construed the "bare words affirmative action as will effectuate
the purposes of the statute, ... to authorize a monetary award. "389
In rendering its opinion, the court of appeals focused on the
legislative background of the Commission to determine whether the
Maryland General Assembly conferred the power to award compensatory damages. 39o The court found that although the Commission's
powers have changed throughout time, for the first thirty-five years
of its existence, the Commission possessed no enforcement powers
[d. (citation omitted).
380. See id.
381. See id. at 566, 325 A.2d at 742.
382. See id.
383 .. See id.
384. See id.
385. [d. at 567, 325 A.2d at 742.
386. See id. at 568, 325 A.2d at 743.
387. See id. at 568-69, 325 A.2d at 743.
388. [d. at 568, 325 A.2d at 743.
389. [d. (internal quotation marks omitted).
390. See id. at 575-76, 325 A.2d at 74647.
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whatsoever.39I The Commission was granted the power to seek court
enforcement of its orders only after the state banned racial discrimination in 1963.392 The court of appeals determined that since 1963,
the Maryland General Assembly never specifically enlarged the
Commission's enforcement powers; thus, the Commission had no
authority to award compensatory or other damages. 393
The Gutwein court concluded that because the legislature did
not delegate the power to award damages to the Commission, and
because it would be unlikely that the legislature would intend to
confer the power to award compensatory damages without adequate
guidelines or limitations, the agency was not entitled to make any
monetary awards. 394 The court of appeals cautioned "that even when
the legislature is fairly explicit about the meaning of 'affirmative action,' a monetary damage remedy is not to be lightly implied. "395
While the imposition of a monetary damage award appears to be
quite analogous to an imposition of a fine, Section V of this Note
demonstrates that they are apparently considered distinct by the
court of appeals.
V.

LUSSIER v. MARYLAND RACING COMMISSION

A.

History of the Maryland Racing Commission

Originally, in Maryland, counties individually regulated horse
racing. 396 Although some counties established commissions to regulate racing,397 in most counties the judiciary regulated racing. 398 This
scheme continued virtually unchanged until 1919, when, in Close v.
Southern Maryland Agriculture Ass'n,399 the court of appeals held that
judicial regulation of horse racing violated the separation of powers
391. See id. The Commission's authority was limited to the study and survey of interracial problems and relations. See id. at 576, 325 A.2d at 747.
392. See id.
393. See id.
394. See id. at 576-77, 325 A.2d at 747. The court noted that the statute did not
speak in terms of remedying the effects of discrimination, but attempted to
provide a means to halt discrimination. See id. at 568-69, 325 A.2d at 743. The
court further contrasted this with Title VII claims in which there is a specific
provision for awarding damages. See id. at 569-70, 325 A.2d at 743-44.
395. Id. at 574, 325 A.2d at 746.
396. See Lussier v. Maryland Racing Comm'n, 343 Md. 681, 691, 684 A.2d 804, 808
(1996).
397. See id.
398. See id.
399. 134 Md. 629, 108 A. 209 (1919).
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principle. 4oo
In Close, a statute enacted by the General Assembly granted
county circuit courts the power to issue any person a license permitting betting, pool selling, and bookmaking, provided that an application was filed and notification given. 401 The Close court held that
the statute violated the separation of powers provision of Maryland's
Constitution because it conferred non-judicial duties on the
judiciary.402
Following the decision in Close, the Maryland General Assembly
enacted Chapter 273 of the Acts of 1920 that created the Maryland
Racing Commission (MRC).403 The 1920 statute conferred upon the
MRC a· broad delegation of power to regulate racing in general. 404
400. See id. at 644, 108 A. at 215 (holding that article 27, sections 217 to 221 of the
Annotated Code of Maryland violated article 8 of Maryland's Declaration of
Rights).
401. See id. at 630, 108 A. at 210.
402. See id. at 642, 108 A. at 214; see also Lussier, 343 Md. at 691, 684 A.2d at 809.
The statute required an individual seeking a license to file an application with
the circuit court that then gave public notice of the application. See Close, 134
Md. at 635, 108 A. at 212. The court of appeals explained the nature of the
judicial duties after an application was filed as follows:
If the petitioner complies with all of the requirements of the statute,
what is there for the court to try? If it is a valid statute, what sort of
cause would be sufficient to justifY the court in refusing a license?
Surely the court, if acting judicially, cannot be governed by the individual views of the judges as to betting, or pool selling or bookmaking on horse races. There is nothing in the statute to be determined,
excepting the name of the applicant, the name of the grounds, a definite description of the place where such grounds are located,
whether the certificate is signed by at least 25 respectable qualified
voters of the election district, and the number of days and months
within which the license shall be operative, even if an order to show
cause is intended to be passed. All those things can be done by the
clerk of the court.
Id. at 642, 108 A. at 214-15.
403. See Lussier, 343 Md. at 691, 684 A.2d at 809. The statute contained detailed
provisions relating to licensing and regulating persons conducting horse racing in Maryland. See id. However, the statute provided that the "Racing Commission shall have full power to prescribe rules, regulations and conditions
under which all horse-races shall be conducted within the State of Maryland.
Said Commission may make rules governing, restricting or regulating betting
on such races." Id. at 692, 684 A.2d at 809 (citing Act of Mar. 31, 1920, ch. 273
§ 1(11), 1920 MD. LAws 479, 484-85).
404. The statute broadly stated that the MRC shall have full authority to prescribe
rules under which all racing shall be conducted including the power to regulate any horse race meeting "for purse, stake or reward." Id.
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Specifically, the 1920 statute granted the MRC explicit authority to
regulate racetrack owners and operators. 405 However, the 1920 statute did not "expressly authorize the [MRC] to license and regulate
racehorse owners, trainers [or] jockeys."406
In 1921, the Attorney General was called upon by the MRC to
clarify whether the MRC could require trainers and jockeys to be licensed. 407 The Attorney General concluded that the legislature intended for the licensure of trainers and jockeys to fall within the
scope of authority granted to the MRC. 408
Shortly thereafter,409 the MRC adopted a regulation pertaining
not only to licensure, but to the conduct of racehorse owners, trainers, and jockeys.410 Since then, the MRC has adopted regulations
governing racehorse owners, trainers, and jockeys, which, for all intents and purposes, have paralleled the statutory provisions411 enacted by the General Assembly that expressly authorize the MRC to
regulate racetrack owners and operators. 412 Among the regulations
promulgated by the MRC was a provision that granted itself the
power to suspend or revoke a license, as well as impose a fine on
any person licensed by the MRC to participate in racing. 413 The
MRC implied that it had the authority to adopt this regulation
based on the· broad power in its enabling legislation that granted it
the power to promulgate reasonable rules necessary to regulate all
matters pertaining to horse racing. 414 The regulation allows the
405.
406.
407.
408.

409.
410.

411.
412.
413.
414.

See id. at 694, 684 A.2d at 810.
See id. at 692, 684 A.2d at 809.
See id.
See id. The Attorney General concluded that the General Assembly intended
to grant "broad and sweeping powers of control and regulation of racing" in
order to secure clean racing. [d. at 693, 684 A.2d at 810 (citing 6 Op. Att'y
Gen. 480, 482 (1921». The Attorney General's conclusion was accepted by the
court of appeals in Mahoney v. Byers, 187 Md. 81, 84-85, 48 A.2d 600, 602
(1946) (holding that the 1920 act creating the MRC includes the power and
authority to promulgate reasonable rules to govern the racing of horses, including rules governing "the conduct of trainers, jockeys, [and]
[horse]owners," as well as to "generally regulate all matters pertaining to
horse racing").
Lussier, 343 Md. at 695, 684 A.2d at 811.
See COMAR 09.1O.04.03D. These regulations, applicable to owners, jockeys and
trainers, under COMAR 09.1O.01.01A, provided the MRC with the power to issue fines not exceeding $5000. See id. at 09.1O.04.03D(2).
See MD. CODE ANN., Bus. REG. § 11-308 (1997).
See Lussier, 343 Md. at 695, 684 A.2d at 811.
See COMAR 09.1O.04.03D.
See MD. CODE ANN., Bus. REG. § 11-21O(a) (1) (1997).
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MRC to punish racehorse owners, jockeys, and trainers engaged in
specific types of misconduct in a manner parallel to the explicit statutory authority granted to the MRC to punish, suspend, or fine
racetrack owners and operators. 415 Since 1921, the MRC has exercised this regulatory power. 416 It was not until Lussier v. Maryland
Racing Commission that the court of appeals addressed whether this
statutory grant included the power to fine racehorse owners,417 and
if so, whether such a grant was constitutional. 418
B.

Factual Background

Frank P. Lussier, a Vermont resident, purchased three horses in
the spring of 1991. 419 Lussier purchased the horses hoping to race
them and "make some money. "420 Later that year, the horses were
shipped to Maryland and each horse was entered in a separate race
at Laurel Race Course.421
Perfect Reign, the first of these horses to compete, had been
sold to Woodard Tuttle six days prior to its race. 422 Tuttle purchased
the horse for $5000, despite being told that the horse "might last 20
starts [or] ... a couple starts. "423 The entry form listed Tuttle as the
horse's owner and trainer. 424 Although Lussier had sold the horse,
he was present at Laurel Race Course and bet approximately $5400
on Perfect Reign. 425 Perfect Reign won the race; Lussier collected
$15,000 and subsequently repurchased the horse from Tuttle for
$6000. 426
Lussier then asked a relatively unknown trainer, Jody Marsh, to
train his second horse, The Manager. 427 Marsh replaced Lussier's
well-known trainer Michael Downing, who according to Lussier, was
going to be out of the country on The Manager's race date. 428
415.
416.
417.
418.
419.
420.
421.
422.
423.
424.
425.
426.
427.
428.

See Lussier, 343 Md. at 696, 684 A.2d at 811.
See id. at 692-94, 684 A.2d at 809-10.
See id. at 695-97,684 A.2d at 807-D8.
See id. at 700, 684 A.2d at 813.
See id. at 683, 684 A.2d at 805.
Lussier v. Maryland Racing Comm'n, 100 Md. App. 190, 193, 640 A.2d 259,
261 (1994), afJ'd, 343 Md. 681, 684 A.2d 804 (1996).
See id. at 194, 640 A.2d at 261.
See id.
[d. (alteration in original).
See id.
See id. at 195, 640 A.2d at 262.
See id. at 196, 640 A.2d at 262.
See id. at 197, 640 A.2d at 263.
See id.
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Marsh agreed to train The Manager with no discussion as to salary
or compensation. 429 Marsh was subsequently listed as the horse's
trainer on the racing forms.43o Lussier bet heavily on his horse, and
The Manager won the race. 431
Lussier's third horse, High Passer, raced at Laurel Race Course
on December 31, 1991. 432 Lussier sold High Passer four or five days
prior to the race. 433 Again, Lussier appeared at the racetrack and
bet on the horse. 434 High Passer came in third at Laurel Race
Course. 435 Mter the race, the buyer rescinded the sale because of an
alleged injury High Passer suffered during the race. 436 None of the
horses had ever raced before the events at Laurel Race Course; consequently, race times were not published before their races.437 Instead of performance times from previous races, workout times were
published. 438
The MRC commenced an investigation into these suspect actions and concluded that Lussier participated in improper acts relating to racing in violation of COMAR 09.10.01.11A(14) and COMAR
09.1O.01.25B(8).439 In particular, the MRC found that in each race,
the information pertaining to workout times and trainers for
Lussier's horses was falsified or concealed. 440 Consequently, the
MRC imposed a $5000 fine pursuant to COMAR 09.10.04.03D.441
429.
430.
431.
432.
433.
434.
435.
436.
437.
438.

See id.
See id. at 198, 640 A.2d at 263.
See id.
See id. at 199, 640 A.2d at 264.
See id. at 199-200, 640 A.2d at 264.
See id. at 200, 640 A.2d at 264.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 195, 198, 200, 640 A.2d at 262, 263, 264.
See id. Replacing prior race times with workout times was permitted by regulation. See id. at 195, 640 A.2d at 262.
439. See Lussier v. Maryland Racing Comm'n, 343 Md. 681, 684, 684 A.2d 804, 805
(1996). The MRC concluded that Lussier had violated COMAR
09.1D.0l.llA(l4) by transferring "two of his horses from himself to the name
of another person for a purpose other than the legitimate sale of the horses."
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). The MRC also contended that Lussier
had conducted dishonest acts in connection with racetrack activities; therefore
he was charged with violating COMAR 09.1O.01.25B(8).
440. See id.
441. See id. at 684, 684 A.2d at 805. COMAR 09.10.04.03D provides:
D. Denials of Licenses and Sanctions. (1) The Commission may refuse to issue or renew a license, or may suspend or revoke a license
issued by it, if it finds that the applicant or licensee: (a) Has engaged
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Lussier filed an action in the Circuit Court for Baltimore
County challenging the administrative decision on several
grounds. 442 The circuit court affirmed the decision of the MRC.443
Lussier appealed the trial court verdict to the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland, again raising several issues. 444 Specifically, Lussier
challenged the fine imposed by the MRC for his alleged violation of
MRC regulations. 445
The court of special appeals began its analysis by rebuffing
Lussier's contention that an administrative agency lacked power to
fine, absent express statutory authority.446 The court concluded that

442.
443.
444.

445.
446.

in unethical or criminal conduct; (b) Is associating or consorting
with an individual who has been convicted of a crime in any jurisdiction; (c) Is consorting or associating with, or has consorted with, a
bookmaker, tout, or individual of similar pursuits; (d) Is, or has
been, operating as a bookmaker, tout, or a similar pursuit; (e) Is not
financially responsible; (f) Has been engaged in, or attempted to engage in, any fraud or misrepresentation in connection with the racing or breeding of a horse; (g) Assaults, or threatens to do bodily injury to, a member of the Commission or any of its employees or
representatives or a member or employee of an association; (h) Has
engaged in conduct detrimental to racing; or (i) Has violated, or attempted to violate: (i) A law or regulation in any jurisdiction, including this State, or (ii) A condition imposed by the Commission. (2)
Instead of, or in addition to, suspending a license, the Commission may impose a fine not exceeding $5,000. (3) In determining the penalty to be
imposed, the Commission shall consider the: (a) Seriousness of the
violation; (b) Harm caused by the violation; (c) Good faith or lack of
good faith of the licensee; and (d) Licensing history of the licensee.
Id. at n.l (emphasis added).
See id. at 684, 684 A.2d at 805.
See id.
See Lussier v. Maryland Racing Comm'n, 100 Md. App. 190,202,640 A.2d 259,
265 (1994), a/i'd, 343 Md. 681, 684 A.2d 804 (1996). Lussier raised five issues
that were addressed by the court of special appeals: (1) that the MRC lacked
the statutory authority to fine because the statute creating and empowering
the MRC did not provide express authority to fine; (2) that the MRC disregarded its own standards when fining him; (3) that there was insufficient evidence to support the MRC's findings; (4) that the MRC regulation was unconstitutionally vague; and (5) that the MRC issued an improper subpoena which
was illegally enforced. See id. The court rejected each of these arguments and
affirmed. See id. at 202-21, 640 A.2d at 265-75.
See id. at 193, 640 A.2d at 261.
See id. at 203, 640 A.2d at 266. The court of special appeals stated that
Lussier's reliance on cases requiring a constitutional inquiry was misplaced. See
id. The court reasoned that courts applying a constitutional analysis have
never considered whether an agency possessed the power to impose civil fines
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the issue turned on whether the power to fine was consistent with
the purpose of the statute. 447 The court reasoned that, in light of
the legislative history and purpose of the statute, the power to fine
was implicitly included in the MRC's broad enabling statute. 448 The
court, therefore, rejected each of Lussier's contentions that the
MRC had no authority to fine him.449
Lussier appealed this decision to the Court of Appeals of Maryland arguing, inter alia, that "[d) elegations of legislative power to
administrative agencies are constitutional only when accompanied
by [a] 'standard or rule by which that power should be exercised.' "450 The court of appeals granted certiorari to consider
whether the MRC could impose a fine under its broad empowering
statute, absent express statutory authority.451 The court held that the
broad delegation of authority to the MRC included the power to establish a regulation that authorized it to issue fines. 452
The Lussier court began its examination of the issue by refuting
Lussier's argument that administrative agencies lack the authority to
fix penalties absent specific statutory authorization from the legisla-

447.

448.
449.
450.

451.

452.

and that the cases relied upon were therefore irrelevant. See id. Accordingly,
the court did not make a constitutional inquiry. See id.
See id. at 204, 640 A.2d at 266. The court stated that "a court must examine
the purpose of the statute creating the agency, its legislative history, and any
relevant case law to determine whether the legislature intended that the
agency have the challenged authority." Id. (citations omitted).
See id. at 212, 640 A.2d at 270.
See id.
Brief for Petitioner at 18, Lussier v. Maryland Racing Comm'n, 343 Md. 681,
684 A.2d 804 (1996) (No. 94-96) (citing Electric Pub. Utils. Co. v. Public Servo
Comm'n, 154 Md. 445, 453, 140 A.2d 840, 843 (1928); Albert v. Public Servo
Comm., 209 Md. 27, 34, 120 A.2d 346,349 (1956».
See Lussi(ff, 343 Md. at 684, 684 A.2d at 805. Lussi(ff quoted section 11-210 of
the Business Regulation Article of the Annotated Code of Maryland, which provides in relevant part:
(a) In generaL-Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section,
the Commission may: (1) adopt regulations and conditions to govern
racing and betting on racing in the State . . . (b) Prohibited regulations.-The Commission may not adopt regulations that allow: (1)
racing a breed of horse not now authorized by law; or (2) holding.
currently unauthorized: (i) intertrack betting; (ii) off-track betting; or
(iii) telephone betting other than telephone account betting.
Id. at 687-88, 684 A.2d at 807. The court noted that the statute in question
provided broad powers to the MRC to adopt regulations to govern racing in
Maryland and then specifically restricted those powers. See id. at 687, 684 A.2d
at 807.
See id. at 700, 684 A.2d at 813.
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ture. 453 Lussier's misplaced reliance on Holy Cross in support of this
proposition was highlighted by the court. 454 The court opined that
Holy Cross addressed whether an administrative agency possessed the
power to set fees under its broad statutory grant, not whether an
administrative agency could impose penalties. 455 The court explained that the power to set fees was irrelevant to the argument
that agencies require express authority to impose fines. 456 However,
the court failed to draw a distinction between the power to set
fees 457 and the power to fine.
Thereafter, the court examined Lussier's reliance on Gutwein. 458
Lussier argued that, under Gutwein, administrative agencies lack authority to fix penalties without a specific grant of power from the
legislature. 459 The Lussier court distinguished Gutwein as pertaining
to the power of an administrative agency, in light of its history, to
make an award of compensatory damages to a victim of discrimination. 460 As Gutwein dealt with neither an agency adopted penalty nor
a regulation, the court found Lussier's reliance was again
misplaced. 461
Similarly, the court observed that Lussier's reliance on Investor's
Funding was misguided. 462 The court noted that in Investor's Funding,
a statute had specifically authorized the agency to impose a fine.463
According to the Lussier court, the issue in Investor's Funding was
whether, and under what circumstances, the legislature could constitutionally delegate the authority to impose fines.464
453. See id. at 685-87, 684 A.2d at 805·.07.
454. See id. at 685-86, 684 A.2d at 806. Lussier relied on Holy Cross to support his argument that administrative agencies lack authority to fix penalties absent specific authority from the legislature. See id. at 685, 684 A.2d at 806.
455. See id. at 686, 684 A.2d at 806. For a discussion of Holy Cross, see supra notes
336-55 and accompanying text.
456. See Lussier, 343 Md. at 686, 684 A.2d at 806.
457. See Holy Cross Hosp. v. Health Servs. Cost Review Comm'n, 283 Md. 677, 687,
393 A.2d 184, 186 (1978) (holding that the agency did not inherently possess
the power to set physicians' fees).
458. See Lussier, 343 Md. at 686, 684 A.2d at 806.
459. See id.
460. For a discussion of Gutwein, see supra notes 376-95 and accompanying text.
461. See Lussier, 343 Md. at 686, 684 A.2d at 806.
462. See id. Lussier relied on Investor's Funding to bolster his argument that an administrative agency lacks the power to fix penalties absent express statutory
authority. See id.
463. For a discussion of the statute in Investor's Funding, see supra note 209.
464. See Lussier, 343 Md. at 686, 684 A.2d at 806.
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The court concluded that when the General Assembly delegates
broad authority to regulate, the regulations promulgated pursuant
to the statute are valid if they are consistent with the language or
purpose of the enabling statute.465 The statute creating the MRC
contained a broad grant of power from the legislature. 466 Mter considering the language, purpose, and history of the MRC, the court
determined that the power to fine racehorse owners was consistent
with the purpose of the enabling statute. 467

VI.

ANALYSIS

A.

Critique of the Court:S Rationale

The Lussier court devoted the bulk of its attention to an issue
of statutory construction that was unremarkable. From the record, it
was clear that the General Assembly intended to permit the MRC to
impose fines on racehorse owners. The statutory language was ambiguous inasmuch as it spoke in broad, unspecified terms about the
MRC's power to regulate racehorse owners.468 Thus, presuming the
constitutionality of the delegation of power, the court properly
looked to the canons of statutory construction to determine legislative intent. 469 Looking to the three primary methods courts employ
to determine legislative intent in the administrative law context,470
Lussier provides a textbook example in which all three methods bolster the court's conclusion.
First, the Lussier court properly accorded deference to the
MRC's construction of its enabling statute. 471 From its inception, the
MRC continuously construed its enabling statute to grant it the
power to regulate racehorse owners in parallel fashion to racetrack
owners.472 During the entire history of the MRC, it never wavered
from the construction it initially placed on the enabling statute. 473
This evinces a long-standing agency construction of its enabling stat465.
466.
467.
468.

469.
470.
471.
472.
473.

See id. at
See id. at
See id. at
See supra
684 A.2d
grant an
See supra
See supra
See supra
See supra
See supra

688, 684 A.2d at 807.
687, 684 A.2d at 807.
688-89, 684 A.2d at 808.
notes 403-06 and accompanying text. But see Lussier, 343 Md. at 710,
at 818 (Bell, J., dissenting) (noting that when the legislature wants to
agency the power to fine, it knows how to do so explicitly).
note 467 and accompanying text.·
notes 327-35 and accompanying text.
notes 322-26 and accompanying text.
notes 409-16 and accompanying text.
notes 409-16 and accompanying text.
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ute that a court may properly accord substantial weight. 474
Second, the Attorney General's opinion provides additional
support for the MRC's exercise of power over racehorse owners.475
Through the doctrine of contemporaneous construction,476 the
court of appeals was well within its power to infer legislative acquiescence by way of the 1921 Attorney General's opinion that supported
the manner by which the MRC regulated racehorse owners.477 Indeed, the Attorney General's broad interpretation of the MRC's
power had been accepted as controlling by the court of appeals in
an earlier decision. 478
Third, the legislative history of the statute and the agency provides convincing support for the court's conclusion. 479 The MRC exercised the power to fine racehorse owners for decades and the legislature made no attempt to curtail it through statutory
amendments. 48o Indeed, the inference of legislative acquiescence
was solidified as early as 1947, when the General Assembly made an
explicit reference to this power in creating the Relief Fund of the
MRC.481
It is rare to find a better example of a case in which all three
of the primary methods of statutory construction point to the con474.
475.
476.
477.
478.
479.
480.
481.

See supra notes 322-26 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 364-75 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 369-75 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 407'{)8 and accompanying text.
See supra note 408 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 326, 376-95 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 409-18 and accompanying text.
See Lussier v. Maryland Racing Comm'n, 343 Md. 681, 696 n.5, 684 A.2d 804,
811 n.5 (1996). As the Lussier court noted:
The General Assembly has clearly been aware of the Maryland
Racing Commission's regulation authorizing the imposition of fines
upon racehorse owners, jockeys, trainers, and others, and has legislated with respect to those fines. See, e.g., Ch 786 of the Acts of 1947,
authorizing the Commission to establish 'the Relief Fund of the Maryland Racing Commission,' referring in both the title and the preamble to the 'fines and [monetary] penalties ... collected from jockeys, trainers, owners and others,' and providing that such fines
should continue to be paid into the Relief Fund.
See also the Department of Fiscal Service's Sunset Review of the
Maryland Racing Commission for 1989, at 37-38, referring to the
Commission's authority to impose fines upon "general" licensees
such as racehorse owners, trainers and jockeys, and commending the
effectiveness of these monetary penalties.
Id.
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elusion that the court of appeals properly reached. In narrowly focusing its attention on the statutory construction analysis, however,
the court of appeals may have inadvertently altered the way future
lower courts view the nondelegation doctrine in Maryland administrative law.
In large part, the Lussier court ignored the constitutional issues
raised on appeal and never conducted a nondelegation doctrine or
separation of powers analysis. 482 Instead, the Lussier court focused
the bulk of its attention on construing the enabling statute at issue.
The Lussier court merely applied a test of "consistency"483 to determine if the legislature had properly delegated the power to fine
racehorse owners to the MRC. In reaching its verdict, the court
seemed to ignore well-settled precedent.
The three primary cases relied on by Lussier, hastily distinguished by the court of appeals, each demonstrated the appropriate
inquiry into the constitutionality of a delegation of legislative power
to the executive branch. 484 This constitutional inquiry was necessarily antecedent to resolving any statutory construction issue. 485 The
Lussier court merely "rubber-stamped" the MRC's authority to write
a regulation absent specific legislative authority. An administrative
agency's promulgation and enforcement of punitive regulations
without specific statutory authority had, until Lussier, been unconstitutiona1. 486 Moreover, the court incorrectly rejected Lussier's reliance on three significant administrative law opinions: Holy Cross,
Gutwein, and Investor's Funding. 487
As to the constitutional argument raised by Lussier, the court
began its analysis by stating that Holy Cross dealt with whether an administrative agency's authority extends to the regulation of fees
482. For a discussion of the court of appeals's limited constitutional analysis, see
supra notes 453-65 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the court of appeals's statutory construction analysis see supra notes 465-81 and accompanying text.
483. See Lussier, 343 Md. at 687, 684 A.2d at 806·07 ("[T]he governing standard is
whether the regulation is " 'consistent with the letter and spirit of the law
under which the agency acts'» (quoting Christ v. Department of Natural Resources, 335 Md. 427, 437, 644 A.2d 34, 38 (1994) (quoting Department of
Transp. v. Armacost, 311 Md. 64, 74, 532 A.2d 1056, 1061 (1987»».
484. For a discussion of the court's limited constitutional analysis, see supra notes
453-65 and accompanying text.
485. See supra notes 208-62 and accompanying text.
486. See Lussier, 343 Md. at 704, 684 A.2d at 815 (Bell, J. dissenting).
487. See supra notes 208-18, 336-55, 376-95 and accompanying text.
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charged by physicians. 488 However, the Holy Cross court began its
analysis with the premise that an administrative agency has no inherent powers and its powers do not reach beyond those provided
by statute. 489 The Holy Cross court, however, did not actually reach
its statutory construction analysis because there was no evidence
that "total costs of the hospital" included "fees of the physicians."49o
Thus, because the fundamental premise of Holy Cross was that administrative agencies lack power absent that conferred by statute,
the Lussier court incorrectly categorized Holy Cross as merely a statutory construction case.
The court committed a similar error in addressing Lussier's reliance on Gutwein. According to the court, Gutwein dealt with an
agency's authority to make an award of compensatory damages. 491
488. See Lussier, 343 Md. at 685-86, 684 A.2d at 806. The court specifically stated
that Holy Cross "was not concerned with the imposition of penalties; instead,
the question in that case was whether, as a matter of statutory construction,
an administrative agency's statutory authority to regulate hospital rates extended to fees charged by physicians to hospital patients." [d.
489. See Holy Cross Hosp. v. Health Servs. Cost Review Comm'n, 283 Md. 677, 683,
393 A.2d 181, 184 (1978). The Holy Cross court stated: "It is elementary that
since an administrative agency, such as the Commission, is a creature of statute, it has no inherent powers and its authority thus does not reach beyond
the warrant provided by statute." [d. (citing Gutwein v. Easton Publ'g Co., 272
Md. 563, 575-77, 325 A.2d 740, 747 (1974». After making this statement, the
Holy Cross court proceeded to recite several canons of statutory construction.
See id. at 684, 393 A.2d at 184-85. However, the court failed to reach the statutory construction issue because it was impossible to determine whether physicians' fees were included. See id. at 689, 393 A.2d at 187.
490. [d. The court remanded for further proceedings to afford the Commission the
opportunity to introduce evidence that the "total costs of the hospital" was a
term of art and therefore included physicians' fees. [d. at 690, 393 A.2d at 187.
The court stated that if the Commission could not produce evidence that physicians' fees were included in "total costs," then the Commission "has exceeded
the power vested in it Uy the General Assembly." [d. (emphasis added).
491. See Lussier, 343 Md. at 686, 684 A.2d at 806. The Lussier court stated that
Gutwein concerned the following:
[W] hether, under the pertinent statutory provisions and "[i] n view of
the [Human Relations] Commission's legislative background," the
Human Relations Commission was authorized to make an award of
compensatory damages to a victim of employment discrimination.
Neither a penalty nor a regulation adopted by the agency was involved in the Gutwein case.
[d. However, the Gutwein court clearly stated that it had two reasons for denying the compensatory damages in addition to the legislative background that
the Lussier court addressed. The Gutwein court also looked to the failure of
the enabling statute to specifically authorize an award of compensatory dam-
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However, the Gutwein court specifically stated that in cases allowing
monetary damages, the legislature has only used language "plainly
indicative of a legislative intent to authorize monetary awards."492
Therefore, if the legislature had intended to confer the power to
award fines, Gutwein appears to stand for the proposition that the
legislature must use language "plainly indicative" of that intent. 493
Moreover, the Gutwein court specifically stated that a monetary damage remedy is "not to be lightly implied. "494
Finally, the Lussier court's rejection of Investor's Funding was
flawed. The court of appeals noted that Lussier's reliance on Investor's Funding was misplaced because Investor's Funding dealt with the
validity of a regulation in light of constitutional delegation of powers and due process principles. 495 Lussier's basic contention was that
the MRC lacked the authority to pass a regulation because the regulation would exceed the MRC's authority and would therefore be an
unconstitutional delegation of power. 496 Thus, it would appear that
Lussier's reliance on Investor's Funding was anything but misplaced.
In rejecting Lussier's reliance on these cases, the court implied
that when there is a broad statute delegating legislative power, a reviewing court's only inquiry should be one of statutory construction.
This inquiry appears to supplant the court of appeals's prior constitutional inquiry.

492.

493.
494.
495.

496.

ages, as well as the "unlikelihood of a legislative grant of unbridled power to
an administrative agency to make monetary awards without guidelines or limitations." Gutwein, 272 Md. at 576-77, 325 A.2d at 747.
Gutwein, 272 Md. at 574, 325 A.2d at 746. However, the Gutwein court did note
that no constitutional issue was raised, unlike Investar's Funding. See id. at 574
n.lO, 325 A.2d at 746 n.lO.
See id.
Id. at 574, 325 A.2d at 746.
See Lussier, 343 Md. at 686, 684 A.2d at 806. However, the court's statement is
partially incorrect. In Investar's Funding, there was a statute specifically authorizing the fine, but the court stated that such a delegation without legislative safeguards was invalid. See County Council v. Investor's Funding Corp., 270 Md.
403,441, 312 A.2d 225, 246 (1973). In Lussier, there was no specific delegation
of the power to fine, nor could there be any legislative standards or safeguards accompanying the implied power. Therefore, under Investar's Funding
and Pressman, the statute could have been invalidated not only because there
was no specific delegation, but also because, a fartiari, there were no standards
or safeguards. For a discussion of Investar's Funding, see supra notes 208-18 and
accompanying text. For a discussion of Pressman, see supra notes 239-62 and
accompanying text.
See supra note 450 and accompanying text.
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Future Impact on Maryland Law

Lussier may have altered the way Maryland's courts approach
similar administrative law issues. Lussier's greatest impact is that it
may have eliminated the requirement of legislative standards or
safeguards in delegations of administrative authority. The Lussier
court intimated that lower courts should focus merely upon
whether the challenged statutory interpretation by the administrative agency is consistent with the purpose of the agency's enabling
legislation. 497
Judge Bell, however, noted that until Lussier, the delegation of
legislative authority without legislative standards or safeguards has
previously been held to be unconstitutiona1. 498 In fact, a reviewing
court would first inquire whether the authority was constitutionally
delegable. 499 To determine the constitutionality of the power delegated, the reviewing court must decide whether the statute was accompanied by adequate safeguards or standards or exempt from
these requirements because it was impracticable for the legislature
to fix standards or safeguards. 5°O However, under Lussier, the consti497. See supra note 465, 483 and accompanying text.
498. See Lussier, 343 Md. at 706. fJ7, 684 A.2d at 816 (Bell,]., dissenting). Judge Bell
limited his criticism to the lack of a constitutional inquiry. See id. at 707-08,
684 A.2d at 817 (Bell, J., dissenting). He noted that prior case law considered
whether a power was delegable, and if so, whether the delegation was constitutional. See id. at 707, 684 A.2d at 816 (Bell,]., dissenting). If constitutional, the
court would apply statutory construction in some cases. See id. at 717, 684 A.2d
at 822 (Bell,]., dissenting). Judge Bell also noted that the issue was not
whether the MRC could regulate licensure, but whether they could fine. See
id. at 709-10, 684 A.2d at 818 (Bell,]., dissenting). Judge Bell stated that this
issue is distinguishable from Christ in which the issue was analogous to licensure. See id. at 714-15,684 A.2d at 820 (Bell,]., dissenting). Interestingly, Judge
Bell quoted the intelligible principle test as enunciated by the Supreme Court
in an early non delegation doctrine case. See id. at 705-06, 684 A.2d at 816
(Bell,]., dissenting) (quoting J. W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276
U.S. 394, 409 (1928». For a discussion of J W. Hampton and earlier Supreme
Court non delegation doctrine precedent, see supra notes 70-102 and accompanying text.
499. See supra text accompanying notes 263-66.
500. See supra text accompanying notes 263-66. Maryland has all but eliminated the
standards requirement, which places them in the most liberal category of
states in permitting broad delegations of power to agencies. It is interesting to
note that Maryland is the only state in this category that has the most restrictive type of separation of powers provision. See supra notes 162-79 and accompanying text. But see Department of Transp. v. Armacost, 311 Md. 64, 82, 532
A.2d 1056, 1065 (1987) (noting that the requirement under Maryland's separa-
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tutional line of inquiry is given considerably less attention, and potentially rendered impotent.
Judge Bell recognized that the court validated a statute without
determining whether it was accompanied by adequate standards or
safeguards. 50l The enabling statute was silent as to whether the MRC
could create a regulation that would allow it to impose fines on
racehorse owners. 502 One point that the Lussier court overlooked was
that the enabling statute could not possibly contain legislative standards or safeguards on the exercise of this power because the grant
of power was merely implicit. Under Pressman, the only way that an
enabling statute that lacks standards or safeguards can survive constitutional scrutiny is if it falls within the impracticability exception. 503 However, the Lussier court never inquired whether the Pressman exception of impracticability was met. Therefore, Lussier could
be read to .implicitly overrule both the requirements of legislative
standards or safeguards requirement as well as the alternative requirement of impracticability.504
Furthermore, the cases leading up to Pressman, as well as its
progeny, established a limited category of exceptions to standardless delegations of legislative power to administrative agencies. 505
Formerly, the relaxed standards and safeguards requirements only
applied to a limited category of agency acts that dealt with areas
such as public health and safety.506 By upholding the MRC's regulation without any constitutional inquiry, the Lussier court seemingly
approved a regulation outside the traditional areas of administrative
law that are accorded more liberal treatment. One logical conclusion lower courts might draw from the Lussier opinion is that the
court of appeals has rejected the need for these special categories,
opting instead to treat all delegations liberally.507

501.
502.
503.
504.
505.
506.
507.

tion of powers provision is no higher than the bar under the United States
Constitution) .
See Lussier, 343 Md. at 707-{)8, 684 A.2d at 817 (Bell, J., dissenting).
See supra note 406 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 239-62 and accompanying text.
The legislature, in fact, provided no safeguards whatsoever because the power
to fine was not specifically included in the enabling statute.
See supra notes 192-238 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 192-262 apd accompanying text.
At the very least, the Lussier court created a new administrative regime that
meets the impracticability exception established by the Pressman court. For a
discussion of Pressman, see supra notes 239-62 and accompanying text.
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Further, the Lussier court declined to provide standards to help
courts evaluate administrative regulations in the future. The court
of appeals simply held that because the regulation at issue was consistent with the purpose of the statute, it was a valid exercise of
power. 50S Thus, it appears as though an administrative agency's
power under a broad enabling statute is limited only by what is consistent with the purpose of the statute.
Finally, administrative agencies now have significant powers to
implement their remedies, notwithstanding the possible punitive nature of the sanctions. The inescapable conclusion is that administrative agencies may award compensatory damages, fine individuals, or
impose other sanctions as long as the sanctions are consistent with
the purpose of the agency's enabling statute.
C.

Alternative Approaches to the Power to Fine

The power to impose a fine occupies a unique place in administrative law. 509 Although the nondelegation doctrine acts to protect
against delegations that could be abused by administrative agencies,510 some courts impose stricter applications of the legislative
standards requirement and more conservative approaches to their
statutory construction analysis. 511 These judicial efforts are aimed at
preventing abuses of power by administrative agencies. 512

1.

Florida

In Continental Construction Co. v. Board of Trustees of the Internal
Improvement Trust Fund,513 Continental appealed a final order of the
Board that assessed a fine due to Continental's unauthorized use of
sovereign submerged lands. 514 Continental argued that the penalty
imposed upon them violated Florida's Constitution. 515 The constitutional provision relied on by Continental provided: "No administra508. See supra notes 465, 483 and accompanying text.
509. Indeed, Judge Bell likened the power to fine to a criminal sanction. See
Lussier, 343 Md. at 709 n.7, 684 A.2d at 817 n.7 (Bell,]., dissenting) ("When a
fine or penalty is imposed ... by any ordinance of any incorporated city or
town in this State . . . such act shall be deemed to be a criminal offense unless the offense is defined as a municipal infraction." (quoting MD. ANN. CODE
art. 38, § 1 (1982) (internal quotation marks omitted».
510. See supra note 193 and accompanying text.
511. See supra notes 163-65 and accompanying text.
512. See infra notes 513-45 and accompanying text.
513. 464 So. 2d 204 (Fla. 1985).
514. See id. at 205.
515. See id.
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tive agency shall impose a sentence of imprisonment, nor shall it
impose any other penalty except as provided by law. "516 The court
agreed and explained that the legislative statute granting the Board
broad authority to "police, protect, conserve, improve; ... or take
such other action or do such other things as necessary for the full
protection and conservation of the said lands" did not contain express or specific language granting the Board the authority to impose a fine.517 Therefore, the court held that the rule, promulgated
by the Board to assess fines, violated Florida's constitution and was
invalid. 5ls
2.

California

In People v. Harter Packing Co.,519 the Court of Appeals of California also addressed the issue of whether an administrative agency
may promulgate rules to impose penalties. 520 The California legislature promulgated the Marketing Act of 1937 in an effort to promote the marketing of agriculture products. 521 The Act provided the
Director of Agriculture with the express authority to issue marketing orders to regulate producer marketing, handling, processing
and distribution of agriculture products pursuant to the Act.522 The
Act also granted the Director the authority to impose a penalty fine
of up to $500 for each violation of the Act.523
The Director issued a marketing order outlining specific guide516. Id. at 206.
517. Id. at 207.
518. See id.; see also Department of Envtl. Regulation v. Puckett Oil Co., 577 So. 2d
988, 993 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (holding that the "law is clear that an
agency's authority to impose sanctions must be expressly delegated to the
agency"); Division of Admin. Hearings v. Department of Transp., 534 So. 2d
1219, 1220 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988) (holding that an agency did not have
necessary legislative authority to adopt rule allowing hearing officer to impose
sanction). See generaUy Dan R. Stengle & James Parker Rhea, Putting the Genie
Back in the Bottle: The Legislative Struggle to Contain Rulemaking Uy Executive Agencies, 21 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 415 (1993). The authors summarize Florida's requirement that "[aln enabling statute, however, may not provide unbridled
authority to an administrative agency to decide what the law is. A statute providing such a legislative authorization must ... declare the legislative policy or
standard, and must operate to limit the delegated power." Id. at 415-16. (footnote omitted).
519. 325 P.2d 519 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1958).
520. See id. at 521.
521. See id. at 520.
522. See id. at 520-21.
523. See id.
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lines for canning and freezing peaches. 524 In the order, the Director
established that violations of the order would be determined based
on the tonnage of non-conforming peaches. 525 Specifically, each five
tons, or portion thereof, was considered a single violation of the order. 526 As a result of this order, Harter Packing Company was fined
$5093.527
Initially, the court explained that an administrative agency is a
creature of statute that only possesses the powers specifically
granted to it by the legislature. 528 The court found that the marketing order penalty provision, promulgated by the Director, was not
authorized by the Act. 529 The court noted that" [ilf the act under
which the administrative agency gets its powers provides no sanctions or penalties for failure to comply, the agency may not by rule
promulgate them. "530 From this logic, the court concluded that the
Director could not enlarge a penalty provision in the Act to declare
a different penalty.53!

3.

Rhode Island

The Supreme Court of Rhode Island addressed whether an administrative agency had the implied authority to impose civil fines
against violators of its regulations in F. Ronci Co. v. Narragansett Bay
Water Quality Management District Commission.532 The Rhode Island
General Assembly created the Water Quality ManagementCommission to combat water-quality problems arising from the discharge of
pollutants into Narragansett Bay.533 Mter Ronci, a manufacturer,
continually failed to comply with the Commission's discharge regulations, the Commission commenced enforcement proceedings. 534
The Commission ordered the manufacturer to comply within a
given time period and to pay a civil penalty in the amount of
$219,950 for its violations. 535 The Commission claimed that it had
the authority to issue the fine under its enabling statute that read:
524.
525.
526.
527.
528.
529.
530.
531.
532.
533.
534.
535.

See id. at
See id. at
See id.
See id.
See id. at
See id.
Id.
See id.
561 A.2d
See id. at
See id. at
See id.

519-20.
520.

521.

874 (R.I. 1989).
875.
876.
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"[T]he executive director may institute such civil or criminal proceedings ... for the violation of any provisions of [certain sections
of the enabling statute] or of any permit, rule, regulation or order
issued pursuant thereto."536 The Commission argued that the cited
language granted the agency the option to choose between an administrative or a judicial forum for the pursuit of remedies, and
thus its levy of a civil fine through the administrative proceeding
was permissible. 537
The court rejected the Commission's position, holding that the
plain language of the statute clearly established that after an exhaustion of administrative remedies, the executive director could
then choose to institute proceedings for noncompliance in the Superior Court for the county.538 The statute did not grant an independent choice to levy fines at the administrative level, and such a
levy was an extension of the agency's power beyond the scope of
the enabling legislation. 539 The court reasoned that while an administrative agency does have rather broad discretion to promulgate
regulations based on an interpretation of the enabling legislation, it
may not do so absent a specific or implied grant of authority.540 The
court found that the levying of civil fines was neither express nor
implied in the statutory language and in fact was in "direct contradiction to the specific powers enumerated in their enabling
legislation."541
'
The court bolstered its opinion by pointing to a recent amendment of the enabling legislation that allowed the Commission to impose administrative penalties in addition to those remedies promulgated in the original enactment. 542 The court contrasted the specific
and express grant of authority in the amendment with the absence
of any such language in the original statute. 543 Noting that the
amending language represented "precisely the type of specific statutory grant that the commission needed before levying a civil fine
against the plaintiff,"544 the court held that at the time of the dispute, the Commission had no power to require the manufacturer to
536.
537.
538.
539.
540.
541.
542.
543.

Id. at 880.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 881.
See id.
Id.
See id.
See id.
544. Id.
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pay the levied fine. 545
Each jurisdiction surveyed imposes restrictions on the power to
fine when conferred to administrative agencies. These cases demonstrate the reluctance of courts to allow administrative agencies the
unbridled power to promulgate punitive regulations, even pursuant
to broad statutory grants, without Jegislative standards or procedural
safeguards to prevent abuse by the administrative agency.546
D.

Recommendations to Practitioners

Practitioners challenging the validity of administrative regulations should emphasize that a challenged power is inconsistent with
the enabling statute's purpose. In light of Lussier, this appears to be
the only certain method of demonstrating that a regulation is invalid. Conversely, administrative agencies may cite the broad power
deemed valid in Lussier as support for a sweeping range of regulations. If the court of appeals continues to apply the Lussier framework to delegations of power by the General Assembly, administrative agencies will have broad powers under their enabling statutes
that are limited, not by Maryland's separation of powers provision,
but merely by future courts' interpretations of legislative intent.
As the inquiry presently exists, standards and safeguards are
not necessarily required to accompany delegations. 547 Therefore, individuals subject to an agency's regulations are open to great risk
from the arbitrary exercise of agency power. Moreover, individuals
may now be subject to harsh penalties with little hope of recourse,
either political or lega1. 548 This is the broadest implication that the
545. See id.
546. See supra notes 513-45 and accompanying text; see also In re Fayetteville Hotel
Assocs., 450 S.E.2d 568 (N.C. Ct. App. 1994) (holding that the power to impose sanctions requires specific legislative authority and without such authority, the power to impose sanctions "would exceed the Commission's general
rulemaking authority"); Columbus Wine Co. v. Sheffield, 64 S.E.2d 356, 362
(Ga. Ct. App. 1951) (holding that an administrative agency could not, "by regulation, make penal something not made penal under the law itself, but could
only enforce its regulations by suspension or cancellation of licenses); Groves
v. Modified Retirement Plan, 803 F.2d 109, 117 (3d Cir. 1986) (holding that although an administrative agency has broad discretion to implement remedial
legislation, it may not penalize absent express authority from the legislature).
Under Pressman and Lussier, however, the Court of Appeals of Maryland has
expressed a more liberal approach to the implied powers of administrative
agencies than jurisdictions surveyed.
547. See supra notes 497-507 and accompanying text.
548. Members of administrative agencies are not elected, so it is impossible to
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Lussier opinion could have.
However, it is unlikely that the court of appeals would abandon
the entire framework for deciding nondelegation doctrine cases. Instead, the Lussier opinion indicates the reluctance of the majority of
the court of appeals to strike enabling legislation purely on
nondelegation grounds. The majority'S position will at least require
a practitioner to creatively phrase future nondelegation doctrine
challenges.
Thus, a nondelegation doctrine challenge should be presented
by litigants in the alternative. First, the litigant must assert that the
power exercised by the agency extended beyond the power the legislature may constitutionally delegate. As evidenced by Lussier, the
court of appeals is extremely reluctant to acknowledge this pure
nondelegation argument. A litigant can create an escape hatch for
the court by positing a statutory construction argument through the
canon of judicial restraint. 549
To lead the court into invoking the canon of judicial restraint,
a litigant should assert, in the alternative, that the power exercised
by the agency went beyond that which was delegated by the legislature. This argument should employ the traditional canons of statutory construction. 550 Additionally, the litigant should remind the
court of its duty to rule on non-constitutional grounds whenever
feasible. 55 ! If the agency's act is indicative of standard-less power, a
court could be persuaded to infer that legislature never would have
intended to grant such power to the agency because it would violate
the nondelegation doctrine.552 By presenting these arguments in the

549.
550.
551.
552.

"vote out" an administrator who engages in disfavorable conduct. 1 FRANK E.
COOPER, STATE ADMINISTRATIVE LAw 37-39 (1965). One scholar has noted that
as administrative power increases, the court's power decreases in several ways.
See id. (noting seven distinct negative effects occurring as administrative independence develops). However, on the federal level, administrative agencies are
presently being held vicariously liable through the President. See supra notes
13941 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 147-59 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 147-59 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 147-59 and accompanying text. Cf. Gutwein v. Easton Publ'g
Co., 272 Md. 563, 576-77, 325 A.2d 740,747 (1974).
Cf. Gutwein, at 576-77, 325 A.2d 747. The Gutwein court intimated that this
type of argument may prove particularly persuasive when if concluded its
opinion as follows:
In view of the Commission's legislative background, the failure of [its
enabling statute] to specifically authorize an award of compensatory
damages, the unlikelihood of a legislative grant of unbridled power to an ad-

1998]
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alternative, and highlighting the permissible inference of legislative
intent, a litigant is more likely to prevail than when the argument is
based solely upon constitutional grounds. 553

VII. CONCLUSION
The Lussier court held that an administrative agency's authority
to create a regulation that enabled the agency to impose a fine was
valid under a broad statute granting the power to regulate horse
racing. 554 The opinion stands for validating any broad delegations of
authority, as long as the authority is consistent with the statutory
purpose and does not contradict the language or purpose of the
statute. 555
There is no doubt that the General Assembly can enable an
agency with the power to create regulations that authorize fines.
Prior to Lussier, however, this type of delegation of power had to be
accompanied by legislative standards or safeguards, unless the
agency's jurisdiction fell within one of the carefully defined areas of
regulatory authority and met the Pressman impracticability exception.556 Mter Lussier, it appears as though a delegation of quasilegislative power need not contain standards or safeguards, nor
must it fall within a category of authority subject to the Pressman
exception.
By not undertaking its customary constitutional analysis, the
Lussier court may have compromised its previous requirement of
legislative standards or safeguards accompanying delegations of authority. Furthermore, the Lussier holding broadened the powers
agencies can now imply to include the power to fine. This holding
contravenes prior case law and violates Maryland's separation of

553.
554.
555.
556.

ministrative agency to make monetary awards without guidelines (fT limitations, and the cited cases, we conclude that the Commission's order
granting Gutwein six weeks' loss of pay and moving expenses was
plainly beyond its power and jurisdiction.
Id. (emphasis added). One reason why the court may not have embraced the
canon of judicial restraint is because Gutwein did not challenge the constitutionality of the power delegated to the Commission. See id. at 576 n.lO, 325
A.2d at 746 n.lO.
See supra notes 147-59 and accompanying text.
For a discussion of the enabling statute in Lussier, see supra notes 403"()6 and
accompanying text.
See Lussier v. Maryland Racing Comm'n, 343 Md. 681, 688, 684 A.2d 804, 807
(1996).
See supra notes 239-62 and accompanying text.
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powers principle. 557 To prevent the unintended erosion of the
non delegation doctrine in Maryland, it may be necessary for the
court to reaffirm both its constitutional inquiry as a threshold issue
to any statutory construction analysis, as well as its requirement of
legislative standards to prevent abuse.

Gregory C. Ward

557. For a discussion of the separation of powers principle, see supra notes 183-91
and accompanying text.

